robertts12

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Curso virtual gratuito de
Análise Gráfica
Entre em www.timing.com.br
e baixe o arquivo das Aulas I e II.
Análliise Ellettrôniica dos Mercados
Ano VII - No 374 – 26 de fevereiro de 2.006 www.timing.com.br
Índice
¨ Fundamentos técnicos e comentários 02-13 ¨ Sugestões de compras 18-20
¨ Índices: principais tendências do mercado 14-14 ¨ Principais ações: análises individuais 21-28
¨ O Bovespa visto por fora 15-15 ¨ Inter-relações com o Bovespa 29-32
¨ Indicadores do médio prazo 16-17 Glossário http://www.timing.com.br/revistas/glossario
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AVIISOS
DEVIIDO AO CURSO QUE ESTAREII MIINIISTRANDO EM SÃO PAULO,, NO PRÓXIIMO FIIM
DE SEMANA SÓ PUBLIICAREII UM RESUMO DA REVIISTA MONIITORANDO AS
ESTRATÉGIIAS OPERACIIONAIIS..
Curso ao vivo em São Paulo:
Simetria Sanfonada – Uma Metodologia Alternativa de Análise Gráfica e Estratégias Operacionais
Conteúdo:
1. Curso básico de Análise Gráfica:
Aulas I e II disponíveis no site www.timing.com.br para download gratuito.
Observação: para melhor aproveitamento da parte presencial do curso será necessário que não pairem dúvidas sobre as aulas I e II.
Elas poderão ser extraídas através do fórum no site acima.
2. Definição do estado geral do mercado
2.1 Médias Móveis
2.2 Linha de Avanços e Declínios
2.3 OBV (saldo do volume) e Clímax
3. A Simetria Sanfonada
4. Desdobramentos mais prováveis dos gráficos de barras.
5. O Jogo do mercado e suas estratégias
São Paulo: 03, 04 e 05 de março de 2006
Local: Rua Leopoldo Couto Magalhães Jr., 758 - 1º andar.
Telefone para contato: (0xx21) 8745-0018.
Horário:
Primeiro dia: das 18:00 às 22:00 com intervalo de 15 minutos para um lanche
Segundo e terceiro dia:
Manhã: 8:30 às 12:30 (com intervalo de 15 minutos para um lanche)
Almoço: 12:30 às 13,30 (as despesas correrão por conta dos alunos)
Tarde: 13:30 às 17:30 (com intervalo de 15 minutos para café e água)
Investimento: R$1.000,00 (desconto de 30% para clientes da VIPTRADE)
Faça a sua inscrição em www.timing.com.br
3
VIISÃO GERAL DO MERCADO
Cenário Externo:
FONTE: APLIGRAF
Prosseguem as correções terciárias nas principais bolsas
internacionais em harmonia com a bovespa proporcionando
um cenário favorável para continuação das principais
tendências de alta.
Índice Primária Secundária Terciária
Bovespa Alta Alta Alta
Nasdaq Alta Indefinida Alta
Dow Jones Alta Alta Indefinida
Nikkei Alta Alta Indefinida
CAC-40 Alta Alta Alta
Merval Alta Alta Baixa
FTSE Alta Alta Alta
Hang Seng Alta Alta Alta
DAX-30 Alta Alta Alta
4
Cenário Interno: Os campos de tendência nominal e indexado do Bovespa, sintonizados, voltam a ficar ascendente.
O Bovespa, ainda sob amplo predomínio das forças altistas, segue em tendência de alta testando o TH de 38803 que foi
riscado, mas não foi vencido. Se realmente ultrapassado deixa a porta aberta para continuação da alta rumo às projeções
que variam de 41000 a 45000.
Nas estratégias sugeridas, algumas tentativas de aperto de estopes não foram boas porque as correções acabaram se
convertido em novas bandeiras de alta, mas daqui para frente acho mais prudente continuar trabalhando na rédea curta.
Conforme mensagem postada no egroup Simetria Sanfonada, de acordo com a Teoria de Dow, uma tendência permanece
em andamento até que surja uma prova concreta de que realmente ocorreu uma reversão. Até agora, apesar do indício
provocado pela transferência de posições compradas entre os investidores estrangeiros e as pessoas físicas, nos gráficos
dos principais índices e nas minhas estatísticas, não existe nada nesse sentido!
5
Elementos para reflexão durante os feriados de Momo
No gráfico acima, indexado pelo IGP-DI e atualizado numa base mensal, pode-se ver alguns ciclos de longo prazo da BVRJ
ajustados em abril de 2000 para continuar com os números da BOVESPA. Nele se verifica que do nível corrente ao TH de
06/71 ainda existe espaço para mais uns 38% de alta até chegar lá. Também pode ser visto que desde abril de 86 todas as
ultrapassagens dos topos principais foram abortadas logo após suas ultrapassagens e seguidas por fortes correções.
No gráfico semanal dolarizado do Bovespa chamo sua atenção para o nível em dólares do volume.
6
PARTIICIIPAÇÃO DOS IINVESTIIDORES NA BOVESPA
ATUALIZADOS ATÉ
22/02/2006
ESTRANGEIROS
PESSOAS FÍSICAS
INSTITUCIONAIS
INSTIT. FINANCEIRAS
ACUMULADO
7.559.912.000
(3.484.192.000)
(8.140.912.000)
4.472.752.000
ACUMULADO NO ANO
1.903.235.000
(954.953.000)
(2.035.752.000)
1.399.384.000
ACUMULADO NO MÊS
(710.171.000)
308.428.000
(312.542.0000)
850.030.000
VARIAÇÃO 15/02– 22/02
261.349.000
(117.066.000)
(417.637.000)
373.703.000
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PARTIICIIPAÇÃO DOS IINVESTIIDORES NA BM&F
ATUALIZADOS ATÉ
24/02/2006
PESSOAS JURÍDICAS
FINANCEIRAS
INVEST. INSTITUC.
NACIONAL
INVEST. INSTITUC.
ESTRANGEIRO
C
V
S
C
V
S
C
V
S
CONTRATOS ABERTOS
(POSIÇÃO EM 29/12/05)
8995
7195
1800
13949
25803
(11854)
26612
16390
10222
C
V
S
C
V
S
C
V
S
CONTRATOS ABERTOS
(POSIÇÃO EM 17/02/06)
1730
2485
(755)
12497
26318
(13371)
32876
17533
15343
C
V
S
C
V
S
C
V
S
CONTRATOS ABERTOS
(POSIÇÃO EM 24/02/06)
1790
3810
(2020)
13257
25411
(12154)
32648
17034
15614
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No confronto das forças atuantes no mercado, temos:
As forças descendentes:
01-Setor de Fertilizantes sinalizando baixa
02-Setor de Mineração sinalizando baixa
03-Setor de Transp. Aéreo sinalizando baixa
04-Setor Petroquímico sinalizando baixa
09-Média móvel de 21 do Clímax sinalizando baixa
Tendência Primária de Baixa - Índices Nominais:
Tendência Secundária de Baixa - Índices Nominais:
Tendência Terciária de Baixa - Índices Nominais:
Tendência Primária de Baixa - Índices Indexados U$:
Tendência Secundária de Baixa -Índices Indexados U$:
Tendência Terciária de Baixa - Índices Indexados U$:
As forças ascendentes:
03-Setor de Energia sinalizando alta
06-Setor de Telecomunicações sinalizando alta
07-Setor de Têxtil e Vestuário sinalizando alta
08-Setor de Bancos sinalizando alta
09-Setor de Siderurgia sinalizando alta
10-Setor de Comércio sinalizando alta
11-Setor de Construção sinalizando alta
12-Setor de Petróleo sinalizando alta
13-Setor de Mat. de Transporte sinalizando alta
14-Setor de Papel e Celulose sinalizando alta
15-Setor de Metalurgia sinalizando alta
16-Setor de Fumo e Bebidas sinalizando alta
17-Setor de Mecânica sinalizando alta
18-Setor Eletro-Eletrônico sinalizando alta
23-Campos de tendência ascendente
24-Razão ascendente das tendências terciárias
29-Razão ascendente das tendências secundárias
39-Razão ascendente das tendências primárias
49-Média Móvel de 200 dias da LAM ascendente
59-Média móvel de 200 dias do Bovespa ascendente
Tendência Primária de Alta - Índices Nominais:
69 - IBOV/IBX50/IBX/IVBX/IGC/ FGV100/ISM
Tendência Secundária de Alta - Índices Nominal
74 – IBOV/IBX50/IBX/IVBX/IGC/ FGV100/ISM
Tendência Terciária de Alta - Índices Nominais
75 – IBOV/IBX50/IBX/IVBX/IGC/ FGV100/ISM
Tendência Primária de Alta - Índices Indexados U$:
85 – IBOV/IBX50/IVBX/IGC/FGVE/FGV100/ISM
Tendência Secundária de Alta - Índices Indexados U$:
90 – IBOV/IBX50/IVBX/IGC/FGVE/FGV100/ISM
Tendência Terciária de Alta - Índices Indexados U$:
91 – IBOV/IBX50/IBX/IVBX/FGVE/FGV100/ISM
01........................09
01............................................................................................................35
36............................................................................................................70
71...................................................................91
Com o objetivo de melhor expressar o estado geral do mercado, decidi fazer algumas alterações na metodologia de avaliação das forças que atuam no seu
direcionamento. Acho que não faz muito sentido, por exemplo, que uma tendência primária de baixa tenha o mesmo peso que uma tendência terciária de
baixa. Ou, que os índices de Telecomunicações e Energia, que são formados por mais de 40 ações cada, tenham o mesmo peso que os setores de
Brinquedos, Eletro-Eletrônico, etc, compostos por um reduzido número de ativos.
Sem grandes preocupações matemático-estatísticas, apenas usando um pouco de sensibilidade, passei a atribuir pesos diferenciados para algumas das
forças. Assim, se a maioria dos índices se encontra numa primária de alta ou de baixa passam a ter o valor de 10 unidades; se a maioria dos índices se
encontra numa secundária de alta ou de baixa valem 5 unidades; se a maioria dos índices se encontra numa terciária de alta ou de baixa continuam
valendo 1 ponto. Indicadores primários, como a direção das médias móveis de 200 dias, a razão entre as tendências primárias, etc. passam a ter um valor
de 5 unidades. Enfim, tudo que se referir ao primário, passa a valer 10 pontos, ao secundário 5 pontos e ao terciário 1 ponto.
BOVESPA
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ÍÍNDIICES SETORIIAIIS
10
ÍÍNDIICES SETORIIAIIS
11
ÍÍNDIICES SETORIIAIIS
12
ÍÍNDIICES SETORIIAIIS
13
RAIIO X DA EVOLUÇÃO DAS TENDÊNCIIAS DAS AÇÕES QUE COMPÕEM O MERCADO
14
PRIINCIIPAIIS TENDÊNCIIAS DO MERCADO:: ESTATÍÍSTIICAS
BOVESPA
Participação Setorial
¨Teles:
¨ Petróleo: ¨ Energia:
¨Bancos:
Variações (%U$) (%R$)
¨Semanal (0,30) 0,49
¨Mensal 4,38 0,59
¨Anual 26,49 15,40
Suportes e Resistências
¨Sup 16.451 35.891
¨Res 18.303 38.978
IBX- BRASIL
Participação Setorial
¨Teles ¨Petróleo ¨Bancos ¨Energia Variações (%U$)
¨Semanal 0,04
¨Mensal 2,59
As tendências primárias, secundárias e terciárias, sintonizadas, estão em alta. ¨Anual 28,23
Suportes e Resistências (U$)
¨Sup 5.374
O Princípio da Confirmação
¨Res 5.932
FGV-100 E
Participação Setorial
¨Teles
¨Energia
Variações (%U$)
¨Semanal (0,61)
¨Mensal 6,73
¨Anual 26,95
Suportes e Resistências (U$)
¨Sup: 449.376
¨Res: 510.527
FGV-100
Participação Setorial
¨Teles
¨Energia
¨Mineração
¨Siderurgia
Variações (%U$)
¨Semanal 0,08
¨Mensal 5,42
¨Anual 21,28
Suportes e Resistências (U$)
¨Sup: 246.184
Os índices seguem sintonizados confirmando uns aos outros na tendência de alta.
¨Res: 270.720
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BOVESPA VIISTO POR FORA
O Bovespa segue em tendência de alta. As médias móveis de 21 períodos do indicador de Clímax voltam a sinalizar baixa. Os MACDs
semanais seguem sinalizando alta. Os estocásticos calculados sobre os dados diários caminha para a região de mercado sobre-vendido.
As razões das tendências primária e secundária seguem em alta.
16
IINDIICADORES DA TENDÊNCIIA DE MÉDIIO PRAZO
Þ O Bovespa e a LAD do mercado (nominal)
O Bovespa e a LAD do mercado
seguem em sintonia, confirmando um
ao outro na tendência de alta.
Þ A LAD do mercado e a sua média móvel de 200 dias (nominal)
A média móvel de 200 dias da LAD
segue sinalizando alta.
17
IINDIICADORES DA TENDÊNCIIA DE MÉDIIO PRAZO
Þ A Média Móvel de 21p do Clímax convencional do Bovespa indexado pelo U$ comercial
Os indicadores voltam a sinalizar
queda.
Þ A Média Móvel de 21p do Clímax convencional do Bovespa nominal
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SUGESTÕES DE COMPRAS//VENDAS
ATIVO INÍCIO COMANDO ESTOPE ÚLTIMA ESTADO ALVO/RES
AELP3 (AES ELPA) Comprar a 18,41 FA 15,46
ALLL4 (ALLAmer Lat) Comprar a 26,11 FA 22,90
ALPA4 (Alpargatas) 24/01/06 Comprar a 79,11 79,39 90,00 comprado
ARCE3 (Arcelor) Comprar a 34,71 FA 31,98
ARTE4 (Kuala) Comprar a 8,61 FA 6,59
BBAS13 (Bonus BB)
BBAS13 (Bonus BB)
21/11/05 Comprar a 13,61
Comprar a 32,61
27,79
FA
28,48
E: 23/02/06 +104,18%
BBAS3 (BCO. DO BRASIL) Comprar a 62,61 FA 54,99
BBDC3 (Bradesco) 16/01/06 Comprar a 68,81 (EJ a 68,78) 77,97 80,49 comprado
BCAL6 (Bicicleta Caloi) Comprar a 0,27 FA 0,19
BESP4 (Banespa) 15/02/06 Comprar a 395,11 379,89 399,00 comprado
BRAP4 (Bradespar) Comprar a 76,51 FA 71,20
CEPE5 (Celpe) 23/09/05 Comprar a 12,51 (EJ a 12,21) 16,39 17,00 comprado
CESP4 (Cesp) Comprar a 28,61 FA 25,50
CGAS5 (Comgas) Comprar a 293,01 FA 277,00
CLSC6 (Celesc) Comprar a 1,79 FA 1,68
CMIG3 (Cemig) 22/02/06 Comprar a 89,41 79,99 86,48 comprado
CNFB4 (Confab) 17/02/06 Comprar a 4,01 3,69 4,09 comprado
COCE5 (Coelce) 22/02/06 Comprar a 10,46 8,69 11,50 comprado
CPFE3 (CPFL ENERGIA) 24/02/06 Comprar a 31,81 29,49 30,39 comprado
CSAN3 (Cosan) 13/02/06 Comprar a 111,61 97,49 106,00 E: 20/02/06 (12,65%)
CTAX4 (Contax) Comprar a 3,31 FA 2,98
DASA3 (Dasa) Comprar a 62,11 FA 52,95
DPPI4 (Ipiranga Distrb.) 09/01/06 Comprar a 40,61 44,89 46,50 comprado
DURA4 (Duratex) 08/02/06 Comprar a 37,01 (EJ a 36,64) 36,39 38,50 comprado
ELPL4 (Eletropaulo) 13/02/06 Comprar a 114,11 101,97 104,71 comprado
ETER3 (Eternit) Comprar a 9,01 FA 8,45
FBRA4 (Fertibrás) Comprar a 29,02 FA 24,18
GOAU4 (Gerdau Metalúrgica) Comprar a 59,21 (EJ a 58,52) 57,59 59,47 comprado
GOLL4 (Gol) 30/01/06 Comprar a 68,51 62,89 70,07 comprado
IDNT3 IIdéias Net) Comprar a 4,01 FA 3,20
ITSA4 (Itausa) 04/01/06 Comprar a 7,81 8,97 9,25 comprado
LAME3 (Lojas Americanas) 30/08/05 Comprar a 62,11 (EJ a 61,51) 104,89 110,00 comprado
MWET4 (Wetzel) Comprar a 6,01 FA 4,95
NATU3 (Natura) 05/01/06 Comprar a 113,01 115,89 124,00 comprado
PCAR4 (Pão de Açúcar) 23/02/06 Comprar a 88,11 82,97 84,00 comprado
PIBB11 Comprar a 57,31 FA 56,30
POMO4 (Marcopolo) Comprar a 6,63 FA 6,50
PSSA3 (Porto Seguro) 13/01/06 Comprar a 26,61 29,97 31,21 comprado
PTIP4 (Ipiranga Petróleo) Comprar a 34,31 FA 33,50
RAPT4 (Randon) 27/12/05 Comprar a 7,41 9,49 9,85 comprado
ROMI4 (Inds. Romi) 08/12/05 Comprar a 71,51 84,89 87,00 comprado
RSID3 (Rossi Resid) 20/02/06 Comprar a 27,61 21,89 28,30 comprado
SGAS4 (Supergasbras) Comprar a 6,41 FA 5,39
SUBA3 (Submarino) 14/02/06 Comprar a 52,41 45,69 52,40 comprado
TAMM4 (Tam) 11/01/06 Comprar a 47,61 46,89 47,95 E: 23/02/06 (1,51%)
TCOC3 (Tele Centro Oeste) 11/11/05 Comprar a 20,61 (EJD a 19,86) 36,89 39,99 comprado
TCSL3 (Tim Part) 24/02/06 Comprar a 8,71 7,97 8,73 comprado
TDBH3 (Telef. Data Br) 19/01/06 Comprar a 0,66 0,65 0,71 comprado
TMAR5 (Telemar N L) Comprar a 66,01 FA 62,70
UBBR11 26/01/06 Comprar a 35,11 33,49 37,20 comprado
UBBR3 (Unibanco) Comprar a 18,91 (EJD a 18,68) 22,09 23,50 comprado
UNIP6 (Unipar) Comprar a 2,41 FA 2,13
WEGE4 (Weg) 09/01/06 Comprar a 8,31 7,59 7,65 E: 22/02/06 (8,66%)
As opiniões e análises aqui descritas são baseadas em estudos gráficos, estatísticos, matemáticos, não sendo, portanto, a expressão máxima da verdade. Resultados
passados não significam e/ou garantem resultados futuros. Sendo assim, não existem formas de responsabilidade por fatos não ocorridos.
Copyright – Todos os direitos Reservados – Proibida sua reprodução total ou parcial sem autorização da Timing.
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REGIISTRO DAS OPERAÇÕES ENCERRADAS EM 2006
ATIVO COMPRA VENDA DATA ESTOPE DATA VARIAÇÃO* ORIGEM**
AMBV4 888,48 22/12//05 859,89 02/01/06 (3,33%) AD
BBDC4 57,34 01/11/05 67,39 02/01/06 17,52% AD
GGBR4 34,51 05/12/05 37,89 02/01/06 9,79% AD
CSNA3 44,21 01/11/05 48,69 02/01/06 10,13% AD
USIM5 48,01 17/11/05 54,97 02/01/06 14,49% AD
BBDC3 54,04 01/11/05 62,89 02/01/06 16,37% SC
GOAU4 45,11 06/12/05 46,39 02/01/06 2,83% SC
GOLL4 45,21 10/11/05 64,89 03/01/06 43,53% SC
AMBV4 888,48 22/12//05 868,97 02/01/06 (2,19%) SC
TRPL3 26,37 14/09/05 30,29 06/01/06 14,86% SC
USIM5 45,56 17/11/05 52,97 02/01/06 16,26% AI
BBDC4 67,49 02/01/06 72,31 04/01/06 (7,14%) AI
CSNA3 44,21 01/11/05 48,69 02/01/06 10,13% AI
AMBV4 888,48 22/12//05 868,97 02/01/06 (2,19%) AI
GGBR4 35,01 06/12/05 37,89 02/01/06 8,22% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 06/01/06
NETC4 0,91 06/09/05 1,03 09/01/06 13,18% AD
TSPP4 8,51 02/12/05 11,09 10/01/06 30,31% AD
BRKM5 17,51 11/01/06 16,89 12/01/06 (3,54%) AD
TMCP4 4,51 05/12/05 5,17 13/01/06 14,63% AD
EBTP3 5,01 10/11/05 5,39 10/01/06 7,58% SC
UBBR11 24,16 03/11/05 31,59 10/01/06 30,75% SC
EBTP4 6,31 07/12/05 6,39 10/01/06 1,26% AI
GGBR4 39,33 03/01/06 39,97 10/01/06 1,62% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 13/01/06
TRPL4 27,40 08/01/06 27,29 17/01/06 (0,40%) AD
ACES4 28,91 03/01/06 31,89 18/01/06 10,30% AD
PTIP4 27,34 02/12/05 28,87 18/01/06 5,96% AD
PETR4 37,11 02/01/06 41,89 18/01/06 12,88% AD
GGBR4 39,41 03/01/06 39,59 18/01/06 0,45% AD
CSNA3 50,71 04/01/06 52,89 18/01/06 4,29% AD
ELET6 39,61 03/01/06 41,79 20/01/06 5,50% AD
TCOC4 35,21 12/01/06 31,79 20/01/06 (9,71%) AD
TBLE3 16,01 16/01/06 14,89 20/01/06 (6,99%) AD
ALPA4 50,51 17/11/05 74,89 17/01/06 48,26% SC
PCAR4 77,61 28/12/05 81,49 17/01/06 4,99% SC
RSID3 1,17 07/11/05 3,09 18/01/06 164,10% SC
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 20/01/06
CMIG3 74,60 03/01/06 83,39 23/01/06 11,78% AD
CMIG4 89,60 03/01/06 101,89 23/01/06 13,71% AD
TLCP4 36,21 03/01/06 39,89 23/01/06 10,16% AD
VALE3 101,01 04/01/06 105,89 23/01/06 4,83% AD
AMBV4 907,61 04/01/06 899,97 23/01/06 (0,84%) AD
CMIG3 63,50 03/11/05 83,39 23/01/06 31,32% SC
IDNT3 2,71 13/01/06 3,09 24/01/06 14,02% SC
BBAS3 45,01 04/01/06 51,97 27/01/06 15,46% AD
BBAS3 45,01 04/01/06 52,29 27/01/06 16,17% SC
MTSA4 99,03 06/12/05 110,00 27/01/06 11,07% SC
TSPP4 9,51 03/01/06 10,59 23/01/06 11,35% AI
CMIG4 71,32 03/12/05 101,89 23/01/06 42,86% AI
AMBV4 907,61 04/01/06 899,89 23/01/06 (0,85%) AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 27/01/06
ELET6 40,31 03/01/06 43,09 30/01/06 6,89% AD
BRKM5 17,61 18/01/06 17,09 31/01/06 (2,95%) AD
CESP4 15,01 09/01/06 18,39 31/01/06 22,51% AD
LIGH3 16,61 23/02/06 15,09 31/01/06 (9,15%) AD
TCSL3 6,63 12/12/05 7,69 01/02/06 15,98% AD
TCSL4 4,83 17/11/05 7,59 01/02/06 57,14% AD
PETR3 41,61 02/01/06 48,97 02/02/06 17,68% AD
20
PETR4 44,11 20/01/06 44,69 02/02/06 1,31% AD
CLSC6 1,61 16/01/06 1,61 02/02/06 - AD
BRAP4 62,51 05/01/06 72,39 02/02/06 15,5% AD
GGBR4 42,01 19/01/06 45,59 03/02/06 8,52% AD
CMET4 3,81 05/01/06 3,66 03/02/06 -3,93% AD
VALE5 88,31 04/01/06 91,69 03/02/06 2,98% AD
AMBV3 681,26 18/11/05 768,89 31/01/06 12,86% SC
CAFE4 1,81 12/01/06 1,69 30/01/06 -6,82% SC
CPFE3 24,28 03/11/05 29,89 03/01/06 23,1% SC
DURA4 27,61 14/12/05 34,69 30/01/06 25,64% SC
GRND3 23,51 18/01/06 22,97 31/01/06 -2,29% SC
SAPR4 2,31 12/01/06 2,34 01/02/06 1,29% SC
TCSL3 6,73 12/12/05 7,69 01/01/06 14,26% SC
VALE5 88,31 04/01/06 91,59 03/02/06 3,71% AI
ELET6 40,31 03/01/06 42,39 31/01/06 5,16% AI
CMET4 3,81 05/01/06 3,66 03/02/06 -3,93% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 03/02/06
SBSP3 181,11 19/01/06 168,89 07/02/06 -6,74% AD
USIM5 56,11 20/01/06 64,39 07/02/06 14,75% AD
VALE3 110,81 27/01/06 104,89 07/02/06 -5,34% AD
ITAU4 59,58 04/01/06 63,69 08/02/06 6,89% AD
EMBR3 20,01 08/01/06 19,89 08/02/06 -0,6% AD
BESP4 327,11 02/01/06 361,89 07/02/06 10,63% SC
CCRO3 16,52 21/11/05 20,97 09/02/06 26,93% SC
COCE5 6,42 02/12/05 8,89 06/02/06 38,47% SC
DASA3 50,11 20/01/06 55,39 06/02/06 10,53% SC
GUAR4 67,51 02/01/06 97,89 08/02/06 45% SC
PIBB11 48,61 03/01/05 52,89 08/02/05 8,8% SC
SBSP3 174,01 12/01/06 168,89 07/02/06 -2,94% SC
PETR4 37,11 02/01/06 41,59 01/02/06 12,07% AI
CSNA3 57,47 27/01/06 56,29 08/02/06 -2,05% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 10/02/06
ALLL4 18,41 24/11/05 23,89 14/02/06 29,06% SC
ARCE3 32,01 27/01/06 33,19 13/02/06 3.68% SC
BRAP4 62,51 05/01/06 69,59 13/02/06 11,32% SC
GOAU4 50,11 12/01/06 52,97 13/02/06 5,70% SC
RCLS4 0,26 20/01/06 0,21 14/02/06 -19,23% SC
SDIA4 6,83 03/01/06 6,39 13/02/06 -6,44% SC
USIM5 63,81 26/01/06 62,49 14/02/06 -2,06% AI
GGBR4 42,01 19/01/06 42,97 13/02/06 2,28% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 17/02/06
ITAU4 69,61 16/02/06 69,69 22/06/06 ZERO AD
BBDC4 76,57 19/01/06 85,69 23/02/06 11,91% AD
CSNA3 63,41 15.02.06 63,59 23/02/06 0,28% AD
TCOC4 35,51 10/02/06 31,89 23/02/06 -10,10% AD
TLPP4 50,11 19/01/06 49,89 23/02/06 -0,43% AD
USIM5 74,71 20/02/06 70,80 23/02/06 -5,23% AD
ELET6 46,31 15/02/06 46,09 24/02/06 -0,47% AD
BBAS13 13,61 21/11/05 27,79 23/02/06 104,18% SC
CSAN3 111,61 13/02/06 97,49 20/02/06 -12,65% SC
TAMM4 47,61 11/01/06 46,89 23/02/06 -1,51% SC
WEGE4 8,31 09/01/06 7,59 22/02/06 -8,66% SC
*Variação Bruta: não está incluída nenhuma despesa.
**AD: operação sugerida na planilha das análises diárias; SC: operação sugerida na seção das Sugestões de Compra/Venda da revista;
AI: operações sugeridas na seção das Análises Individuais da revista.
21
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Petrobrás em Real (PETR4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 9,227%)
Suportes
¨MP: 7,06
¨CP: 42,82/40,12/39/35,46/34,48
Resistências
¨MP: 47,30
¨CP: 45,68
Objetivo: alta 47,3; baixa 28,86
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 47,41 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
22
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Usiminas em Real (USIM5 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 5,593%)
Suportes
¨MP: 20,05
¨CP:
62,25/53,81/52,5/51,94/49,37/47,6
Resistências
¨MP: 75,99
¨CP: 75,99
Objetivos: alta 74,67; baixa 38,64
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
comprou (20/02/06) a 74,71 e segue
comprado. Mantenha um estope em
62,19. Se vier a ser estopado, apenas
encerre a operação.
Þ Bradesco pn em Real (BBDC4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 3,777%)
Suportes
¨MP: 10,01
¨CP: 79,8/78,28/75,81/74,96/70,27
Resistências
¨MP: 90,20
¨CP: 90,20
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 65,47
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373, segue
comprado (19/01/06) a 76,61. Suba o seu
estope 84,59. Se vier a ser estopado,
apenas encerre a operação.
Se depois que tiver sido estopado o preço
voltar a subir, recompre na ultrapassagem
do topo histórico e coloque um estope
inicial um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
23
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Telemar pn em Real (TNLP4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 8,117%
Suportes
¨MP: 15,81
¨CP: 38,85/36,86/35,23/33,08/32,72
Resistências
¨MP: 45,44
¨CP: 41/41,95/43,45
Objetivos: Alta 45,44; Baixa 33,08
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 45,61com estope inicial um
pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ Telesp Celular Part. pn em Real (TSPP4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 1,414%)
Suportes
¨MP: 5,89
¨CP: 9,91/8,4/7,3/6,36
Resistências
¨MP: 101,83
¨CP: 11,96/12,34/13,17/16,31/19,37
Objetivo: alta 19,37; baixa 5,89
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
continua fora do mercado..
Comprar a 12,01 e coloque um estope
inicial um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
24
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Vale do Rio Doce em Real (VALE5 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 8,095%)
Suportes
¨MP: 2,76
¨CP: 84,1/82/79,67/77,71/74/72,5
Resistências
¨MP: 97,99
¨CP: 88,95/92,00
Objetivo: 97,99 ?; baixa 74,00
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 98,01 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ Siderúrgica Nacional ON em Real (CSNA3 – PESO NO BOVESPA: (4,23%)
Suportes
¨MP: 23,29
¨CP: 55,6/50,76/45,84/44,9/43,5/41,82
Resistências
¨MP: 67,80
¨CP: 67,80
Objetivos: alta ?; baixa 37,10
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373, segue
comprado a 63,41 (16/02/07). Suba o seu
estope para 62,69.
Se for estopado e logo após o preço voltar
a subir, recompre na ultrapassagem do TH
e coloque um estope um pouco abaixo do
fundo anterior.
25
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Eletrobrás em Real (ELET6 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,755%)
Suportes
¨MP: 10,71
¨CP: 39,65/38,66/37,11/36,5/33,3
Resistências
¨MP: 49,80
¨CP: 49,80
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 36,59
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373, segue
comprado a 46,31 (16/02/06. Mantenha o
seu estope em 44,79.
Se vier a ser estopado e logo após o
preço voltar a subir, recompre na
ultrapassagem do topo anterior e coloque
um estope um pouco abaixo do fundo
anterior.
Þ Embratel pn em Real (EBTP4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,188%)
Suportes
¨MP: 1,14
¨CP: 5,05/4,89/4,84/4,46/4,22
Resistências
¨MP: 43,92
¨CP: 5,78/5,91/6,59/6,89/7,08/7,24/7,7
Objetivo: alta 7,08 baixa: 3,42
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
continua fora do mercado.
Continuarei aguardando um pouco mais
desdobramento para montagem de novas
estratégias.
``
26
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Caemi pn em Real (CMET4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 4,128%)
Suportes
¨MP: 0,86
¨CP: 3,4/3,26/3,22/3,16/3,07/2,73/2,62
Resistências
¨MP: 3,98
¨CP: 3,70
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 3,26
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 4,01 com um estope inicial um
pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ Itaú pn em Real (ITAU4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,77%)
Suportes
¨MP: 21,25
¨CP: 66,31/63,1/62,22/60,27/54,18
Resistências
¨MP: 73,00
¨CP: 73,00
Objetivo: alta 69,55; baixa 48,12
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373, segue
comprado (04/01/06) a 59,61 (EJ a 59,58).
Mantenha o seu estope em 65,97.
Se vier a ser estopado e logo após o preço
voltar a subir, recompre na ultrapassagem
do topo histórico e coloque um estope
inicial um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
27
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Cemig pn em Real (CMIG4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,328%)
Suportes
¨MP: 30,69
¨CP: 100/98/85,52/81,13/77,04/73,56
Resistências
¨MP: 113,98
¨CP: 113,98
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 74,09
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
comprou (22/02/06) a 110,01 e segue
comprado. Mantenha o seu estope em
99,89. Se vier a ser estopado, apenas
encerre a operação.
Þ AmBev/Braskem em Real (BRKM5 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,914%)
Suportes
¨MP: 407,95
¨CP: 877,7/852,01/849,91/822,1/786,5
Resistências
¨MP: 965,00
¨CP: 939/944,99
Objetivo: alta 965; baixa 739
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 965,11 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
28
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Brasil Telecom pn (BRTO4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,208%)
Suportes
¨MP: 5,58
¨CP: 9,31//8,58/7,78
Resistências
¨MP: 15,84
¨CP: 11,25/12,8/15,84
Objetivo: alta 15,84; baixa 7,78
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
comprou (14/02/06) a 10,81 e segue
comprado. Mantenha o seu estope em
10,29. Se vier a ser estopado, apenas
encerre a operação.
Þ Net pn (PLIM4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,176%)
Suportes
¨MP: 0,13
¨CP: 1,06/1,03/1,02/0,94/0,85/0,82
Resistências
¨MP: 31,10
¨CP: 1,21/1,29/2,78
Objetivo: alta 30,79; baixa 0,51
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
segue comprado (24/01/06) a 1,18.
Mantenha um estope em 1,05. Se vier a
ser estopado, apenas encerre a operação.
29
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Gerdau pn (GGBR4 –PESO NO BOVESPA 3,512%)
Suportes
¨MP: 2,38
¨CP: 47,05/41,43/39,15/37,26
Resistências
¨MP: 49,09
¨CP: 49,09
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 27,12
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
comprou (22/02/06) a 49,01 (EJ a 48,32) e
segue comprado. Mantenha o seu estope
em 46,89.
Se vier a ser estopado e logo após o
preço voltar a subir, recompre na
ultrapassagem do TH e coloque um
estope inicial um pouco abaixo do fundo
anterior.
Þ Futuro do Bovespa
Tendências
¨Primária: ALTA
¨Secundária: ALTA
¨Terciária: INDEFINIDA
Suportes: 33330/36515/36240/35650
Resistências: 39630/42280/48290
Comentário
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 39710 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
30
IINTER--RELAÇÕES DE MERCADOS COM O BOVESPA
Þ Dow Jones
Tendências
¨Primária: ALTA
¨Secundária: ALTA
¨Terciária: INDEFINIFA
Suportes
¨MP: 7197
¨CP:10737/10661/10652/10519/10388
Resistências
¨MP: 11750
¨CP: 11159/11350/11401
Comentário
O DJ volta a ficar indefinido no curto prazo
e entra numa baixista rumo ao fundo da
formação de alargamento.
Observação: na maior parte do tempo,
o DJ e o Bovespa costumam caminhar
na mesma direção.
Þ Nasdaq Composite
Tendências
¨Primária: ALTA
¨Secundária: INDEFINIDA
¨Terciária: ALTA
Suportes
¨MP: 1253
¨CP: 2235/2190/2163/2064/2026/1944
Resistências
¨MP: 5.133
¨CP: 2295/2314/2328/2892
Comentário
O Nasdaq segue corrigindo dentro da
tendência de alta e deve continuar
subindo rumo aos 2300.
Observação: no geral, o NASDAQ e o
Bovespa tendem a caminhar na mesma
direção.
31
IINTER--RELAÇÕES DE MERCADOS COM O BOVESPA
Þ Ouro Spot (BM&F)
Tendências
¨Primária: ALTA
¨Secundária: BAIXA
¨Terciária: INDEFINIDA
Suportes
¨MP: 20,50
¨CP: 37,5/36,5/35,4/35/32,2
Resistências
¨MP: 43,80
¨CP: 40,2/41,25/41,60
Comentário
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 43,91 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior..
Observação: o preço do Ouro costuma
se mover na direção inversa do
Bovespa, sendo por isso considerado
contra-cíclico.
Þ Eurodólar
Tendências
¨Primária: BAIXA
¨Secundária: ALTA
¨Terciária: BAIXA
Suportes
¨MP: 0,8228
¨CP: 1,186/1,18/1,164/1,138/1,08
Resistências
¨MP: 1,367
¨CP: 1,203/1,219/1,233/1,246/1,259
Comentário
Se seguiu as instruções da RV373,
continua fora do mercado.
Continuarei aguardando mais
desdobramento para montagem de novas
estratégias.
32
IINTER--RELAÇÕES DE MERCADOS COM O BOVESPA
Þ Futuro do Petróleo (crude oil light)
Tendências
¨Primária: INDEFINIDA
¨Secundária: INDEFINIDA
¨Terciária: ALTA
Suportes
¨MP: 24,82
¨CP: 59,7/57,55/56,9/55,72/55,4
Resistências
¨MP: 70,85
¨CP: 63,25/66,62/69,20
Comentário
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV373,
continua fora do mercado.
Aguardarei mais desdobramento para
montagem de novas estratégias.
Þ Futuro do Dólar
Tendências
¨Primária: BAIXA
¨Secundária: BAIXA
¨Terciária: BAIXA
Suportes
¨MP: 2157,00
¨CP: 2157,00
Resistências
¨MP: 6103,83
¨CP: 2219,5/2254/2366,33/2404,77
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
vendeu a 2210,89 (rolado para o novo
vencimento a 2233,57) e segue vendido.
Abaixe o seu estope para 2213,01.
Observação: normalmente, anda na
contra-mão do Bovespa.
As opiniões e análises aqui descritas são baseadas em estudos gráficos, estatísticos, matemáticos, não sendo, portanto, a expressão máxima da verdade. Resultados
passados não significam e/ou garantem resultados futuros. Sendo assim, não existem formas de responsabilidade por fatos não ocorridos.
Copyright – Todos os direitos Reservados – Proibida sua reprodução total ou parcial sem autorização da Timing.

1
Curso virtual gratuito de
Análise Gráfica
Entre em www.timing.com.br
e baixe o arquivo das Aulas I e II.
Análliise Ellettrôniica dos Mercados
Ano VII - No 373 – 19 de fevereiro de 2.006 www.timing.com.br
Índice
¨ Fundamentos técnicos e comentários 02-12 ¨ Sugestões de compras 17-19
¨ Índices: principais tendências do mercado 13-13 ¨ Principais ações: análises individuais 20-27
¨ O Bovespa visto por fora 14-14 ¨ Inter-relações com o Bovespa 28-31
¨ Indicadores do médio prazo 15-16 Glossário http://www.timing.com.br/revistas/glossario
2
AVIISOS
Curso ao vivo em São Paulo:
Simetria Sanfonada – Uma Metodologia Alternativa de Análise Gráfica e Estratégias Operacionais
Conteúdo:
1. Curso básico de Análise Gráfica:
Aulas I e II disponíveis no site www.timing.com.br para download gratuito.
Observação: para melhor aproveitamento da parte presencial do curso será necessário que não pairem dúvidas sobre as aulas I e II.
Elas poderão ser extraídas através do fórum no site acima.
2. Definição do estado geral do mercado
2.1 Médias Móveis
2.2 Linha de Avanços e Declínios
2.3 OBV (saldo do volume) e Clímax
3. A Simetria Sanfonada
4. Desdobramentos mais prováveis dos gráficos de barras.
5. O Jogo do mercado e suas estratégias
São Paulo: 03, 04 e 05 de março de 2006
Local: Rua Leopoldo Couto Magalhães Jr., 758 - 1º andar.
Telefone para contato: (0xx21) 8745-0018.
Horário:
Primeiro dia: das 18:00 às 22:00 com intervalo de 15 minutos para um lanche
Segundo e terceiro dia:
Manhã: 8:30 às 12:30 (com intervalo de 15 minutos para um lanche)
Almoço: 12:30 às 13,30 (as despesas correrão por conta dos alunos)
Tarde: 13:30 às 17:30 (com intervalo de 15 minutos para café e água)
Investimento: R$1.000,00 (desconto de 30% para clientes da VIPTRADE)
Faça a sua inscrição em www.timing.com.br
3
VIISÃO GERAL DO MERCADO
Cenário Externo:
FONTE: APLIGRAF
Prosseguem as correções terciárias nas principais bolsas
internacionais em harmonia com a bovespa dando suporte
para as principais tendências de alta.
Índice Primária Secundária Terciária
Bovespa Alta Alta Indefinida
Nasdaq Alta Indefinida Indefinida
Dow Jones Alta Alta Alta
Nikkei Alta Alta Baixa
CAC-40 Alta Alta Alta
Merval Alta Alta Baixa
FTSE Alta Alta Alta
Hang Seng Alta Baixa Indefinida
DAX-30 Alta Alta Alta
4
Cenário Interno: Os campos de tendência nominal e indexado do Bovespa, sintonizados, voltam a ficar ascendente.
O Bovespa segue em tendência de alta e vem testar o TH de 38803, que se ultrapassado deixa a porta aberta para
continuação da subida rumo às projeções que variam de 41000 a 45000. Todavia, tenho a impressão que existe algo de
podre no reino da Dinamarca e sugiro que apertem os seus estopes sem deixar a menor chance para o azar. A diminuição
de quase um bilhão de reais na posição comprada dos investidores estrangeiros acompanhada de um aumento de quase
quinhentos milhões na posição comprada das pessoas físicas soa como o início da contagem regressiva de uma bomba de
efeito retardado.
5
PARTIICIIPAÇÃO DOS IINVESTIIDORES NA BOVESPA
ATUALIZADOS ATÉ
08/02/2006
ESTRANGEIROS
PESSOAS FÍSICAS
INSTITUCIONAIS
INSTIT. FINANCEIRAS
ACUMULADO
7.338.563.000
(3.367.126.000)
(7.723.275.000)
3.841.633.000
ACUMULADO NO ANO
1.641.886.000
(837.887.000)
(1.618.115.000)
1.025.681.000
ACUMULADO NO MÊS
(971.520.000)
425.494.000
105.095.000
412.651.000
VARIAÇÃO 08/02– 15/02
(973.869.000)
182.267.000
550.149.000
257.416.000
6
PARTIICIIPAÇÃO DOS IINVESTIIDORES NA BM&F
ATUALIZADOS ATÉ
10/02/2006
PESSOAS JURÍDICAS
FINANCEIRAS
INVEST. INSTITUC.
NACIONAL
INVEST. INSTITUC.
ESTRANGEIRO
C
V
S
C
V
S
C
V
S
CONTRATOS ABERTOS
(POSIÇÃO EM 29/12/05)
8995
7195
1800
13949
25803
(11854)
26612
16390
10222
C
V
S
C
V
S
C
V
S
CONTRATOS ABERTOS
(POSIÇÃO EM 10/02/06)
14295
10070
4225
21384
33265
(11881)
29950
21655
8295
C
V
S
C
V
S
C
V
S
CONTRATOS ABERTOS
(POSIÇÃO EM 17/02/06)
1730
2485
(755)
12497
26318
(13371)
32876
17533
15343
7
No confronto das forças atuantes no mercado, temos:
As forças descendentes:
01-Setor de Auto-Peças sinalizando baixa
02-Setor de Fertilizantes sinalizando baixa
03-Setor de Mineração sinalizando baixa
04-Setor de Transp. Aéreo sinalizando baixa
05-Setor Petroquímico sinalizando baixa
Tendência Primária de Baixa - Índices Nominais:
Tendência Secundária de Baixa - Índices Nominais:
Tendência Terciária de Baixa - Índices Nominais:
Tendência Primária de Baixa - Índices Indexados U$:
Tendência Secundária de Baixa -Índices Indexados U$:
Tendência Terciária de Baixa - Índices Indexados U$:
As forças ascendentes:
03-Setor de Energia sinalizando alta
06-Setor de Telecomunicações sinalizando alta
07-Setor de Têxtil e Vestuário sinalizando alta
08-Setor de Bancos sinalizando alta
09-Setor de Siderurgia sinalizando alta
10-Setor de Comércio sinalizando alta
11-Setor de Construção sinalizando alta
12-Setor de Petróleo sinalizando alta
13-Setor de Mat. de Transporte sinalizando alta
14-Setor de Papel e Celulose sinalizando alta
15-Setor de Metalurgia sinalizando alta
16-Setor de Fumo e Bebidas sinalizando alta
17-Setor de Mecânica sinalizando alta
22-Campos de tendência ascendente
23-Razão ascendente das tendências terciárias
28-Razão ascendente das tendências secundárias
38-Razão ascendente das tendências primárias
48-Média Móvel de 200 dias da LAM ascendente
58-Média móvel de 200 dias do Bovespa ascendente
63-Média móvel de 21 do Clímax sinalizando alta
Tendência Primária de Alta - Índices Nominais:
73 - IBOV/IBX50/IBX/IVBX/IGC/ FGV100/ISM
Tendência Secundária de Alta - Índices Nominal
78 – IBOV/IBX50/IBX/IVBX/IGC/ FGV100/ISM
Tendência Terciária de Alta - Índices Nominais
79 – IVBX/IGC/FGV100/FGVE
Tendência Primária de Alta - Índices Indexados U$:
89 – IBOV/IBX50/IBX/IVBX/IGC/ FGV100/ISM
Tendência Secundária de Alta - Índices Indexados U$:
94 – IBOV/IBX50/IVBX/IGC/FGVE/FGV100/ISM
Tendência Terciária de Alta - Índices Indexados U$:
95 – IBOV/IBX50/IBX/IVBX/FGVE/FGV100/ISM
01..............05
01............................................................................................................35
36............................................................................................................70
71................................................................................95
Com o objetivo de melhor expressar o estado geral do mercado, decidi fazer algumas alterações na metodologia de avaliação das forças que atuam no seu
direcionamento. Acho que não faz muito sentido, por exemplo, que uma tendência primária de baixa tenha o mesmo peso que uma tendência terciária de
baixa. Ou, que os índices de Telecomunicações e Energia, que são formados por mais de 40 ações cada, tenham o mesmo peso que os setores de
Brinquedos, Eletro-Eletrônico, etc, compostos por um reduzido número de ativos.
Sem grandes preocupações matemático-estatísticas, apenas usando um pouco de sensibilidade, passei a atribuir pesos diferenciados para algumas das
forças. Assim, se a maioria dos índices se encontra numa primária de alta ou de baixa passam a ter o valor de 10 unidades; se a maioria dos índices se
encontra numa secundária de alta ou de baixa valem 5 unidades; se a maioria dos índices se encontra numa terciária de alta ou de baixa continuam
valendo 1 ponto. Indicadores primários, como a direção das médias móveis de 200 dias, a razão entre as tendências primárias, etc. passam a ter um valor
de 5 unidades. Enfim, tudo que se referir ao primário, passa a valer 10 pontos, ao secundário 5 pontos e ao terciário 1 ponto.
BOVESPA
8
ÍÍNDIICES SETORIIAIIS
9
ÍÍNDIICES SETORIIAIIS
10
ÍÍNDIICES SETORIIAIIS
11
ÍÍNDIICES SETORIIAIIS
12
RAIIO X DA EVOLUÇÃO DAS TENDÊNCIIAS DAS AÇÕES QUE COMPÕEM O MERCADO
13
PRIINCIIPAIIS TENDÊNCIIAS DO MERCADO:: ESTATÍÍSTIICAS
BOVESPA
Participação Setorial
¨Teles:
¨ Petróleo: ¨ Energia:
¨Bancos:
Variações (%U$) (%R$)
¨Semanal 5,81 3,91
¨Mensal 4,70 0,10
¨Anual 26,88 14,84
Suportes e Resistências
¨Sup 16.451 35.891
¨Res 18.240 38.803
IBX- BRASIL
Participação Setorial
¨Teles ¨Petróleo ¨Bancos ¨Energia Variações (%U$)
¨Semanal 5,32
¨Mensal 2,54
As tendências primárias e secundárias, sintonizadas, seguem em alta. As terciárias divergem. ¨Anual 28,17
Suportes e Resistências (U$)
¨Sup 5.374
O Princípio da Confirmação
¨Res 5.901
FGV-100 E
Participação Setorial
¨Teles
¨Energia
Variações (%U$)
¨Semanal 6,92
¨Mensal 7,39
¨Anual 27,74
Suportes e Resistências (U$)
¨Sup: 449.376
¨Res: 505.204
FGV-100
Participação Setorial
¨Teles
¨Energia
¨Mineração
¨Siderurgia
Variações (%U$)
¨Semanal 4,32
¨Mensal 5,33
¨Anual 21,17
Suportes e Resistências (U$)
¨Sup: 246.184
Os índices seguem sintonizados confirmando uns aos outros na tendência de alta.
¨Res: 270.720
14
BOVESPA VIISTO POR FORA
O Bovespa segue em tendência de alta. As médias móveis de 21 períodos do indicador de Clímax voltam a sinalizar alta. Os MACDs
semanais seguem sinalizando alta. Os estocásticos calculados sobre os dados diários encontram-se na região de mercado sobrecomprado,
com espaço para mais uns poucos dias de alta.
As razões das tendências primária e secundária seguem em alta.
15
IINDIICADORES DA TENDÊNCIIA DE MÉDIIO PRAZO
Þ O Bovespa e a LAD do mercado (nominal)
O Bovespa e a LAD do mercado
seguem em sintonia, confirmando um
ao outro na tendência de alta.
Þ A LAD do mercado e a sua média móvel de 200 dias (nominal)
A média móvel de 200 dias da LAD
segue sinalizando alta.
16
IINDIICADORES DA TENDÊNCIIA DE MÉDIIO PRAZO
Þ A Média Móvel de 21p do Clímax convencional do Bovespa indexado pelo U$ comercial
Os indicadores voltam a sinalizar alta.
Þ A Média Móvel de 21p do Clímax convencional do Bovespa nominal
17
SUGESTÕES DE COMPRAS//VENDAS
ATIVO INÍCIO COMANDO ESTOPE ÚLTIMA ESTADO ALVO/RES
AELP3 (AES ELPA) Comprar a 18,41 FA 16,30
ALLL4 (ALLAmer Lat) 24/11/05 Comprar a 18,51 23,89 22,00 E: 14/02/06 +29,06%
ALPA4 (Alpargatas) 24/01/06 Comprar a 79,11 78,89 81,99 comprado
ARCE3 (Arcelor)
ARCE3 (Arcelor)
27/01/06 Comprar a 30,01 (32,01)
Comprar a 34,71
33,19
FA
32,50
E: 13/02/06 +3,68%
ARTE4 (Kuala) Comprar a 8,61 FA 6,48 ATENÇÃO
BBAS13 (Bonus BB) 21/11/05 Comprar a 13,61 27,79 31,90 comprado
BBAS3 (BCO. DO BRASIL) Comprar a 63,81 FA 60,00
BBDC3 (Bradesco) 16/01/06 Comprar a 68,81 (EJ a 68,78) 75,49 82,15 comprado
BCAL6 (Bicicleta Caloi) Comprar a 0,27 FA 0,19
BESP4 (Banespa) 15/02/06 Comprar a 395,11 379,89 410,00 comprado
BRAP4 (Bradespar)
BRAP4 (Bradespar)
05/01/06 Comprar a 62,51
Comprar a 76,51
69,59
FA
69,34
E: 13/02/06 +11,32%
CEPE5 (Celpe) 23/09/05 Comprar a 12,51 (EJ a 12,21) 15,89 16,50 comprado
CESP4 (Cesp) Comprar a 28,61 FA 25,45
CGAS5 (Comgas) Comprar a 293,01 FA 273,00
CLSC6 (Celesc) Comprar a 1,79 FA 1,76
CMIG3 (Cemig) Comprar a 89,41 FA 86,48
CNFB4 (Confab) 17/02/06 Comprar a 4,01 3,69 4,09 comprado
COCE5 (Coelce) Comprar a 10,46 FA 8,90
CPFE3 (CPFL ENERGIA) Comprar a 31,81 FA 30,39
CSAN3 (Cosan) 13/02/06 Comprar a 111,61 97,49 106,00 comprado
CTAX4 (Contax) Comprar a 3,31 FA 3,10
DASA3 (Dasa) Comprar a 62,11 FA 52,00
DPPI4 (Ipiranga Distrb.) 09/01/06 Comprar a 40,61 42,19 45,50 comprado
DURA4 (Duratex) 08/02/06 Comprar a 37,01 (EJ a 36,64) 34,97 36,30 comprado
ELPL4 (Eletropaulo) 13/02/06 Comprar a 114,11 101,97 115,00 comprado
ETER3 (Eternit) Comprar a 9,01 FA 8,68
FBRA4 (Fertibrás) Comprar a 29,02 FA 24,65
GOAU4 (Gerdau Metalúrgica)
GOAU4 (Gerdau Metalúrgica)
12/01/06 Comprar a 50,11
Comprar a 59,21
52,97
FA
58,20
E: 13/02/06 +5,7%
GOLL4 (Gol) 30/01/06 Comprar a 68,51 62,89 70,00 comprado
IDNT3 IIdéias Net) Comprar a 4,01 FA 2,95
ITSA4 (Itausa) 04/01/06 Comprar a 7,81 8,97 9,41 comprado
LAME3 (Lojas Americanas) 30/08/05 Comprar a 62,11 (EJ a 61,51) 92,89 112,00 comprado
MWET4 (Wetzel) Comprar a 6,01 FA 4,98
NATU3 (Natura) 05/01/06 Comprar a 113,01 115,89 119,50 comprado
PCAR4 (Pão de Açúcar) Comprar a 88,11 FA 84,00
PIBB11 Comprar a 57,31 FA 55,85
PSSA3 (Porto Seguro) 13/01/06 Comprar a 26,61 28,39 30,97 comprado
RAPT4 (Randon) 27/12/05 Comprar a 7,41 8,79 9,67 comprado
RCLS4 (Recrusul) 20/01/06 Comprar a 0,26 0,21 0,26 E: 14/02/06 (19,23%)
ROMI4 (Inds. Romi) 08/12/05 Comprar a 71,51 81,89 85,01 comprado
RSID3 (Rossi Resid) Comprar a 27,61 FA 27,00
SDIA4 (Sadia) 03/01/06 Comprar a 7,01 (EJ a 6,83) 6,39 6,45 E: 13/02/06 (6,44%)
SGAS4 (Supergasbras) Comprar a 6,41 FA 5,32
SUBA3 (Submarino) 14/02/06 Comprar a 52,41 45,69 58,80 comprado
TAMM4 (Tam) 11/01/06 Comprar a 47,61 46,89 49,99 comprado
TCOC3 (Tele Centro Oeste) 11/11/05 Comprar a 20,61 (EJD a 19,86) 36,89 39,99 comprado
TCSL3 (Tim Part) Comprar a 8,71 FA 8,21
TDBH3 (Telef. Data Br) 19/01/06 Comprar a 0,66 0,65 0,70 comprado
TMAR5 (Telemar N L) Comprar a 66,01 FA 62,60
UBBR11 26/01/06 Comprar a 35,11 33,49 36,50 comprado
UBBR3 (Unibanco) Comprar a 18,91 (EJD a 18,68) 22,09 23,38 comprado
UNIP6 (Unipar) Comprar a 2,41 FA 2,14
WEGE4 (Weg) 09/01/06 Comprar a 8,31 7,59 7,90 comprado
As opiniões e análises aqui descritas são baseadas em estudos gráficos, estatísticos, matemáticos, não sendo, portanto, a expressão máxima da verdade. Resultados
passados não significam e/ou garantem resultados futuros. Sendo assim, não existem formas de responsabilidade por fatos não ocorridos.
Copyright – Todos os direitos Reservados – Proibida sua reprodução total ou parcial sem autorização da Timing.
18
REGIISTRO DAS OPERAÇÕES ENCERRADAS EM 2006
ATIVO COMPRA VENDA DATA ESTOPE DATA VARIAÇÃO* ORIGEM**
AMBV4 888,48 22/12//05 859,89 02/01/06 (3,33%) AD
BBDC4 57,34 01/11/05 67,39 02/01/06 17,52% AD
GGBR4 34,51 05/12/05 37,89 02/01/06 9,79% AD
CSNA3 44,21 01/11/05 48,69 02/01/06 10,13% AD
USIM5 48,01 17/11/05 54,97 02/01/06 14,49% AD
BBDC3 54,04 01/11/05 62,89 02/01/06 16,37% SC
GOAU4 45,11 06/12/05 46,39 02/01/06 2,83% SC
GOLL4 45,21 10/11/05 64,89 03/01/06 43,53% SC
AMBV4 888,48 22/12//05 868,97 02/01/06 (2,19%) SC
TRPL3 26,37 14/09/05 30,29 06/01/06 14,86% SC
USIM5 45,56 17/11/05 52,97 02/01/06 16,26% AI
BBDC4 67,49 02/01/06 72,31 04/01/06 (7,14%) AI
CSNA3 44,21 01/11/05 48,69 02/01/06 10,13% AI
AMBV4 888,48 22/12//05 868,97 02/01/06 (2,19%) AI
GGBR4 35,01 06/12/05 37,89 02/01/06 8,22% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 06/01/06
NETC4 0,91 06/09/05 1,03 09/01/06 13,18% AD
TSPP4 8,51 02/12/05 11,09 10/01/06 30,31% AD
BRKM5 17,51 11/01/06 16,89 12/01/06 (3,54%) AD
TMCP4 4,51 05/12/05 5,17 13/01/06 14,63% AD
EBTP3 5,01 10/11/05 5,39 10/01/06 7,58% SC
UBBR11 24,16 03/11/05 31,59 10/01/06 30,75% SC
EBTP4 6,31 07/12/05 6,39 10/01/06 1,26% AI
GGBR4 39,33 03/01/06 39,97 10/01/06 1,62% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 13/01/06
TRPL4 27,40 08/01/06 27,29 17/01/06 (0,40%) AD
ACES4 28,91 03/01/06 31,89 18/01/06 10,30% AD
PTIP4 27,34 02/12/05 28,87 18/01/06 5,96% AD
PETR4 37,11 02/01/06 41,89 18/01/06 12,88% AD
GGBR4 39,41 03/01/06 39,59 18/01/06 0,45% AD
CSNA3 50,71 04/01/06 52,89 18/01/06 4,29% AD
ELET6 39,61 03/01/06 41,79 20/01/06 5,50% AD
TCOC4 35,21 12/01/06 31,79 20/01/06 (9,71%) AD
TBLE3 16,01 16/01/06 14,89 20/01/06 (6,99%) AD
ALPA4 50,51 17/11/05 74,89 17/01/06 48,26% SC
PCAR4 77,61 28/12/05 81,49 17/01/06 4,99% SC
RSID3 1,17 07/11/05 3,09 18/01/06 164,10% SC
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 20/01/06
CMIG3 74,60 03/01/06 83,39 23/01/06 11,78% AD
CMIG4 89,60 03/01/06 101,89 23/01/06 13,71% AD
TLCP4 36,21 03/01/06 39,89 23/01/06 10,16% AD
VALE3 101,01 04/01/06 105,89 23/01/06 4,83% AD
AMBV4 907,61 04/01/06 899,97 23/01/06 (0,84%) AD
CMIG3 63,50 03/11/05 83,39 23/01/06 31,32% SC
IDNT3 2,71 13/01/06 3,09 24/01/06 14,02% SC
BBAS3 45,01 04/01/06 51,97 27/01/06 15,46% AD
BBAS3 45,01 04/01/06 52,29 27/01/06 16,17% SC
MTSA4 99,03 06/12/05 110,00 27/01/06 11,07% SC
TSPP4 9,51 03/01/06 10,59 23/01/06 11,35% AI
CMIG4 71,32 03/12/05 101,89 23/01/06 42,86% AI
AMBV4 907,61 04/01/06 899,89 23/01/06 (0,85%) AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 27/01/06
ELET6 40,31 03/01/06 43,09 30/01/06 6,89% AD
19
BRKM5 17,61 18/01/06 17,09 31/01/06 (2,95%) AD
CESP4 15,01 09/01/06 18,39 31/01/06 22,51% AD
LIGH3 16,61 23/02/06 15,09 31/01/06 (9,15%) AD
TCSL3 6,63 12/12/05 7,69 01/02/06 15,98% AD
TCSL4 4,83 17/11/05 7,59 01/02/06 57,14% AD
PETR3 41,61 02/01/06 48,97 02/02/06 17,68% AD
PETR4 44,11 20/01/06 44,69 02/02/06 1,31% AD
CLSC6 1,61 16/01/06 1,61 02/02/06 - AD
BRAP4 62,51 05/01/06 72,39 02/02/06 15,5% AD
GGBR4 42,01 19/01/06 45,59 03/02/06 8,52% AD
CMET4 3,81 05/01/06 3,66 03/02/06 -3,93% AD
VALE5 88,31 04/01/06 91,69 03/02/06 2,98% AD
AMBV3 681,26 18/11/05 768,89 31/01/06 12,86% SC
CAFE4 1,81 12/01/06 1,69 30/01/06 -6,82% SC
CPFE3 24,28 03/11/05 29,89 03/01/06 23,1% SC
DURA4 27,61 14/12/05 34,69 30/01/06 25,64% SC
GRND3 23,51 18/01/06 22,97 31/01/06 -2,29% SC
SAPR4 2,31 12/01/06 2,34 01/02/06 1,29% SC
TCSL3 6,73 12/12/05 7,69 01/01/06 14,26% SC
VALE5 88,31 04/01/06 91,59 03/02/06 3,71% AI
ELET6 40,31 03/01/06 42,39 31/01/06 5,16% AI
CMET4 3,81 05/01/06 3,66 03/02/06 -3,93% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 03/02/06
SBSP3 181,11 19/01/06 168,89 07/02/06 -6,74% AD
USIM5 56,11 20/01/06 64,39 07/02/06 14,75% AD
VALE3 110,81 27/01/06 104,89 07/02/06 -5,34% AD
ITAU4 59,58 04/01/06 63,69 08/02/06 6,89% AD
EMBR3 20,01 08/01/06 19,89 08/02/06 -0,6% AD
BESP4 327,11 02/01/06 361,89 07/02/06 10,63% SC
CCRO3 16,52 21/11/05 20,97 09/02/06 26,93% SC
COCE5 6,42 02/12/05 8,89 06/02/06 38,47% SC
DASA3 50,11 20/01/06 55,39 06/02/06 10,53% SC
GUAR4 67,51 02/01/06 97,89 08/02/06 45% SC
PIBB11 48,61 03/01/05 52,89 08/02/05 8,8% SC
SBSP3 174,01 12/01/06 168,89 07/02/06 -2,94% SC
PETR4 37,11 02/01/06 41,59 01/02/06 12,07% AI
CSNA3 57,47 27/01/06 56,29 08/02/06 -2,05% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 10/02/06
ALLL4 18,41 24/11/05 23,89 14/02/06 29,06% SC
ARCE3 32,01 27/01/06 33,19 13/02/06 3.68% SC
BRAP4 62,51 05/01/06 69,59 13/02/06 11,32% SC
GOAU4 50,11 12/01/06 52,97 13/02/06 5,70% SC
RCLS4 0,26 20/01/06 0,21 14/02/06 -19,23% SC
SDIA4 6,83 03/01/06 6,39 13/02/06 -6,44% SC
USIM5 63,81 26/01/06 62,49 14/02/06 -2,06% AI
GGBR4 42,01 19/01/06 42,97 13/02/06 2,28% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 17/02/06
*Variação Bruta: não está incluída nenhuma despesa.
**AD: operação sugerida na planilha das análises diárias; SC: operação sugerida na seção das Sugestões de Compra/Venda da revista;
AI: operações sugeridas na seção das Análises Individuais da revista.
20
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Petrobrás em Real (PETR4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 9,227%)
Suportes
¨MP: 7,06
¨CP: 40,12/39/35,46/34,48/32,36
Resistências
¨MP: 47,30
¨CP: 45,45
Objetivo: alta 47,3; baixa 28,86
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 47,41 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
21
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Usiminas em Real (USIM5 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 5,593%)
Suportes
¨MP: 20,05
¨CP:
62,25/53,81/52,5/51,94/49,37/47,6
Resistências
¨MP: 74,67
¨CP: 74,67
Objetivos: alta 74,67; baixa 38,64
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372, foi
estopado na compra (26/01/06) feita a
63,81 em 62,49 (14/02/06) com um custo
de 2,06% e está fora do mercado.
Comprar a 74,71 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ Bradesco pn em Real (BBDC4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 3,777%)
Suportes
¨MP: 10,01
¨CP: 75,81/74,96/70,27/65,61/62,65
Resistências
¨MP: 89,06
¨CP: 89,06
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 65,47
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372, segue
comprado (19/01/06) a 76,61. Suba o seu
estope 79,69. Se vier a ser estopado,
apenas encerre a operação.
Se depois que tiver sido estopado o preço
voltar a subir, recompre na ultrapassagem
do topo histórico e coloque um estope
inicial um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
22
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Telemar pn em Real (TNLP4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 8,117%
Suportes
¨MP: 15,81
¨CP: 36,86/35,23/33,08/32,72
Resistências
¨MP: 45,44
¨CP: 41/41,95/43,45
Objetivos: Alta 45,44; Baixa 33,08
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
continua fora do mercado.
Continuarei aguardando mais
desdobramento para montagem de novas
estratégias.
Þ Telesp Celular Part. pn em Real (TSPP4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 1,414%)
Suportes
¨MP: 5,89
¨CP: `10,8/10,45/8,4/7,3/6,36
Resistências
¨MP: 101,83
¨CP: 11,96/12,34/13,17/16,31/19,37
Objetivo: alta 19,37; baixa 5,89
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
continua fora do mercado..
Comprar a 12,01 e coloque um estope
inicial um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
23
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Vale do Rio Doce em Real (VALE5 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 8,095%)
Suportes
¨MP: 2,76
¨CP: 84,1/82/79,67/77,71/74/72,5
Resistências
¨MP: 97,99
¨CP: 88,95/92,00
Objetivo: 97,99 ?; baixa 74,00
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 98,01 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ Siderúrgica Nacional ON em Real (CSNA3 – PESO NO BOVESPA: (4,23%)
Suportes
¨MP: 23,29
¨CP: 55,6/50,76/45,84/44,9/43,5/41,82
Resistências
¨MP: 65,39
¨CP: 65,39
Objetivos: alta ?; baixa 37,10
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
comprou a 63,41 (16/02/07). Mantenha o
seu estope um pouco abaixo de 55,49.
24
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Eletrobrás em Real (ELET6 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,755%)
Suportes
¨MP: 10,71
¨CP: 39,65/38,66/37,11/36,5/33,3
Resistências
¨MP: 48,90
¨CP: 48,90
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 36,59
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
comprou a 46,31 (16/02/06) e segue
comprado. Suba o seu estope para 44,79.
Se vier a ser estopado e logo após o
preço voltar a subir, recompre na
ultrapassagem do topo anterior e coloque
um estope um pouco abaixo do fundo
anterior.
Þ Embratel pn em Real (EBTP4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,188%)
Suportes
¨MP: 1,14
¨CP: 4,89/4,84/4,46/4,22
Resistências
¨MP: 43,92
¨CP: 5,78/5,91/6,59/6,89/7,08/7,24/7,7
Objetivo: alta 7,08 baixa: 3,42
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
continua fora do mercado.
Continuarei aguardando um pouco mais
desdobramento para montagem de novas
estratégias.
``
25
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Caemi pn em Real (CMET4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 4,128%)
Suportes
¨MP: 0,86
¨CP: 3,4/3,26/3,22/3,16/3,07/2,73/2,62
Resistências
¨MP: 3,98
¨CP: 3,70
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 3,26
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 4,01 com um estope inicial um
pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ Itaú pn em Real (ITAU4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,77%)
Suportes
¨MP: 21,25
¨CP: 66,31/63,1/62,22/60,27/54,18
Resistências
¨MP: 73,00
¨CP: 73,00
Objetivo: alta 69,55; baixa 48,12
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372, segue
comprado (04/01/06) a 59,61 (EJ a 59,58).
Suba o seu estope para 65,97.
Se vier a ser estopado e logo após o preço
voltar a subir, recompre na ultrapassagem
do topo histórico e coloque um estope
inicial um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
26
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Cemig pn em Real (CMIG4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,328%)
Suportes
¨MP: 30,69
¨CP: 100/98/85,52/81,13/77,04/73,56
Resistências
¨MP: 109,80
¨CP: 109,80
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 74,09
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 110,01 com estope inicial um
pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ AmBev/Braskem em Real (BRKM5 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,914%)
Suportes
¨MP: 407,95
¨CP: 877,7/852,01/849,91/822,1/786,5
Resistências
¨MP: 965,00
¨CP: 944,99
Objetivo: alta 965; baixa 739
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 965,11 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
27
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Brasil Telecom pn (BRTO4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,208%)
Suportes
¨MP: 5,58
¨CP: 9,31//8,58/7,78
Resistências
¨MP: 15,84
¨CP: 10,64/10,72/12,8/15,84
Objetivo: alta 15,84; baixa 7,78
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
comprou (14/02/06) a 10,81 e segue
comprado. Mantenha o seu estope em
10,29. Se vier a ser estopado, apenas
encerre a operação.
Þ Net pn (PLIM4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,176%)
Suportes
¨MP: 0,13
¨CP: 1,06/1,03/1,02/0,94/0,85/0,82
Resistências
¨MP: 31,10
¨CP: 1,21/1,29/2,78
Objetivo: alta 30,79; baixa 0,51
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
segue comprado (24/01/06) a 1,18.
Mantenha um estope em 1,05. Se vier a
ser estopado, apenas encerre a operação.
28
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Gerdau pn (GGBR4 –PESO NO BOVESPA 3,512%)
Suportes
¨MP: 2,40
¨CP: 41,81/40,6/39,51/37,6/36,4/33,5
Resistências
¨MP: 48,85
¨CP: 47,2
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 27,12
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372, foi
estopado na compra (19/01/06) feita a
42,01 em 42,97 (13/02/06) com um lucro
de 2,28% e está fora do mercado.
Comprar a 49,01 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ Futuro do Bovespa
Tendências
¨Primária: ALTA
¨Secundária: ALTA
¨Terciária: INDEFINIDA
Suportes: 36515/36240/35650/33865
Resistências: 39630/42280/48290
Comentário
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 39710 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
29
IINTER--RELAÇÕES DE MERCADOS COM O BOVESPA
Þ Dow Jones
Tendências
¨Primária: ALTA
¨Secundária: ALTA
¨Terciária: ALTA
Suportes
¨MP: 7197
¨CP:10737/10661/10652/10519/10388
Resistências
¨MP: 11750
¨CP: 11132/11350/11401
Comentário
O DJ retoma a tendência de alta e se
romper a formação de alargamento deverá
ir testar seu TH.
Observação: na maior parte do tempo,
o DJ e o Bovespa costumam caminhar
na mesma direção.
Þ Nasdaq Composite
Tendências
¨Primária: ALTA
¨Secundária: INDEFINIDA
¨Terciária: INDEFINIDA
Suportes
¨MP: 1253
¨CP: 2235/2190/2163/2064/2026/1944
Resistências
¨MP: 5.133
¨CP: 2314/2328/2892
Comentário
O Nasdaq segue corrigindo dentro da
tendência de alta e deve continuar
subindo rumo aos 2300.
Observação: no geral, o NASDAQ e o
Bovespa tendem a caminhar na mesma
direção.
30
IINTER--RELAÇÕES DE MERCADOS COM O BOVESPA
Þ Ouro Spot (BM&F)
Tendências
¨Primária: ALTA
¨Secundária: BAIXA
¨Terciária: ALTA
Suportes
¨MP: 20,50
¨CP: 37,5/36,5/35,4/35/32,2
Resistências
¨MP: 43,80
¨CP: 39,7/41,25/41,60
Comentário
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 43,91 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior..
Observação: o preço do Ouro costuma
se mover na direção inversa do
Bovespa, sendo por isso considerado
contra-cíclico.
Þ Eurodólar
Tendências
¨Primária: BAIXA
¨Secundária: ALTA
¨Terciária: BAIXA
Suportes
¨MP: 0,8228
¨CP: 1,187/1,18/1,164/1,138/1,08
Resistências
¨MP: 1,367
¨CP: 1,203/1,219/1,233/1,246/1,259
Comentário
Se seguiu as instruções da RV372,
continua fora do mercado.
Continuarei aguardando mais
desdobramento para montagem de novas
estratégias.
31
IINTER--RELAÇÕES DE MERCADOS COM O BOVESPA
Þ Futuro do Petróleo (crude oil light)
Ocorreu um problema com a minha base de dados e não terei como
analisar neste número.
Tendências
¨Primária: INDEFINIDA
¨Secundária: INDEFINIDA
¨Terciária: BAIXA
Suportes
¨MP: 25,04
¨CP: 61,2/57,3/55,72/52,22
Resistências
¨MP: 70,85
¨CP: 63,7/66,82/69,20
Comentário
Þ Futuro do Dólar
Tendências
¨Primária: BAIXA
¨Secundária: BAIXA
¨Terciária: BAIXA
Suportes
¨MP: 2157,00
¨CP: 2157,00
Resistências
¨MP: 6103,83
¨CP: 2219,5/2254/2366,33/2404,77
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV372,
vendeu a 2210,89 e segue vendido.
Mantenha o seu estopem 2220,11.
Observação: normalmente, anda na
contra-mão do Bovespa.
As opiniões e análises aqui descritas são baseadas em estudos gráficos, estatísticos, matemáticos, não sendo, portanto, a expressão máxima da verdade. Resultados
passados não significam e/ou garantem resultados futuros. Sendo assim, não existem formas de responsabilidade por fatos não ocorridos.
Copyright – Todos os direitos Reservados – Proibida sua reprodução total ou parcial sem autorização da Timing.

1
Curso virtual gratuito de
Análise Gráfica
Entre em www.timing.com.br
e baixe o arquivo das Aulas I e II.
Análliise Ellettrôniica dos Mercados
Ano VII - No 372 – 12 de fevereiro de 2.006 www.timing.com.br
Índice
¨ Fundamentos técnicos e comentários 02-12 ¨ Law of charts 17-18
¨ Índices: principais tendências do mercado 13-13 ¨ Sugestões de compras 19-21
¨ O Bovespa visto por fora 14-14 ¨ Principais ações: análises individuais 22-29
¨ Indicadores do médio prazo 15-16 ¨ Inter-relações com o Bovespa 30-33
Glossário http://www.timing.com.br/revistas/glossario
2
AVIISOS
Curso ao vivo em São Paulo:
Simetria Sanfonada – Uma Metodologia Alternativa de Análise Gráfica e Estratégias Operacionais
Conteúdo:
1. Curso básico de Análise Gráfica:
Aulas I e II disponíveis no site www.timing.com.br para download gratuito.
Observação: para melhor aproveitamento da parte presencial do curso será necessário que não pairem dúvidas sobre as aulas I e II.
Elas poderão ser extraídas através do fórum no site acima.
2. Definição do estado geral do mercado
2.1 Médias Móveis
2.2 Linha de Avanços e Declínios
2.3 OBV (saldo do volume) e Clímax
3. A Simetria Sanfonada
4. Desdobramentos mais prováveis dos gráficos de barras.
5. O Jogo do mercado e suas estratégias
São Paulo: 03, 04 e 05 de março de 2006
Local: a ser definido.
Telefone para contato: (0xx21) 8745-0018.
Horário:
Primeiro dia: das 18:00 às 22:00 com intervalo de 15 minutos para um lanche
Segundo e terceiro dia:
Manhã: 8:30 às 12:30 (com intervalo de 15 minutos para um lanche)
Almoço: 12:30 às 13,30 (as despesas correrão por conta dos alunos)
Tarde: 13:30 às 17:30 (com intervalo de 15 minutos para café e água)
Investimento: R$1.000,00 (desconto de 30% para clientes da VIPTRADE)
Faça a sua inscrição em www.timing.com.br
3
VIISÃO GERAL DO MERCADO
Cenário Externo:
FONTE: APLIGRAF
Prosseguem as correções terciárias nas principais bolsas
internacionais em harmonia com a bovespa.
Índice Primária Secundária Terciária
Bovespa Alta Alta Baixa
Nasdaq Alta Indefinida Indefinida
Dow Jones Alta Alta Indefinida
Nikkei Alta Alta Baixa
CAC-40 Alta Alta Indefinida
Merval Alta Alta Baixa
FTSE Alta Alta Indefinida
Hang Seng Alta Baixa Baixa
DAX-30 Alta Alta Alta
4
Cenário Interno: Os campos de tendência nominal e indexado do Bovespa seguem divergindo.
Embora ainda possa voltar a cair e se estender até os 35500/35300 pontos, parece mais provável que a correção terciária
tenha terminado e que o Bovespa prossiga na sua tendência de alta rumo a novas máximas.
5
PARTIICIIPAÇÃO DOS IINVESTIIDORES NA BOVESPA
ATUALIZADOS ATÉ
08/02/2006
ESTRANGEIROS
PESSOAS FÍSICAS
INSTITUCIONAIS
INSTIT. FINANCEIRAS
ACUMULADO
8.312.432.000
(3.549.393.000)
(8.273.424.000)
3.841.633.000
ACUMULADO NO ANO
2.615.755.000
(1.020.154.000)
(2.148.264.000)
768.265.000
ACUMULADO NO MÊS
2.439.000
243.227.000
(445.054.000)
218.911.000
VARIAÇÃO 01/02– 08/02
(114.941.000)
267.217.000
(291.595.000)
155.235.000
6
PARTIICIIPAÇÃO DOS IINVESTIIDORES NA BM&F
ATUALIZADOS ATÉ
10/02/2006
PESSOAS JURÍDICAS
FINANCEIRAS
INVEST. INSTITUC.
NACIONAL
INVEST. INSTITUC.
ESTRANGEIRO
C
V
S
C
V
S
C
V
S
CONTRATOS ABERTOS
(POSIÇÃO EM 29/12/05)
8995
7195
1800
13949
25803
(11854)
26612
16390
10222
C
V
S
C
V
S
C
V
S
CONTRATOS ABERTOS
(POSIÇÃO EM 03/02/06)
14780
9755
5025
23615
23770
(11155)
28892
22515
6377
C
V
S
C
V
S
C
V
S
CONTRATOS ABERTOS
(POSIÇÃO EM 10/02/06)
14295
10070
4225
21384
33265
(11881)
29950
21655
8295
7
No confronto das forças atuantes no mercado, temos:
As forças descendentes:
01-Setor de Auto-Peças sinalizando baixa
02-Setor de Fertilizantes sinalizando baixa
03-Setor de Mineração sinalizando baixa
04-Setor de Transp. Aéreo sinalizando baixa
05-Setor Petroquímico sinalizando baixa
Tendência Primária de Baixa - Índices Nominais:
Tendência Secundária de Baixa - Índices Nominais:
Tendência Terciária de Baixa - Índices Nominais:
06-IBOV/IBX50/IBX/IGC/FGV100/ISM
Tendência Primária de Baixa - Índices Indexados U$:
Tendência Secundária de Baixa -Índices Indexados U$:
Tendência Terciária de Baixa - Índices Indexados U$:
06-IBX50/IBX
As forças ascendentes:
03-Setor de Energia sinalizando alta
06-Setor de Telecomunicações sinalizando alta
07-Setor de Têxtil e Vestuário sinalizando alta
08-Setor de Bancos sinalizando alta
09-Setor de Siderurgia sinalizando alta
10-Setor de Comércio sinalizando alta
11-Setor de Construção sinalizando alta
12-Setor de Petróleo sinalizando alta
13-Setor de Mat. de Transporte sinalizando alta
14-Setor de Papel e Celulose sinalizando alta
15-Setor de Metalurgia sinalizando alta
16-Razão ascendente das tendências terciárias
21-Razão ascendente das tendências secundárias
31-Razão ascendente das tendências primárias
41-Média Móvel de 200 dias da LAM ascendente
51-Média móvel de 200 dias do Bovespa ascendente
Tendência Primária de Alta - Índices Nominais:
61 - IBOV/IBX50/IBX/IVBX/IGC/ FGV100/ISM
Tendência Secundária de Alta - Índices Nominal
66 – IBOV/IBX50/IBX/IVBX/IGC/ FGV100/ISM
Tendência Terciária de Alta - Índices Nominais
Tendência Primária de Alta - Índices Indexados U$:
76 – IBOV/IBX50/IBX/IVBX/IGC/ FGV100/ISM
Tendência Secundária de Alta - Índices Indexados U$:
81 – IBOV/IBX50/IVBX/IGC/FGVE/FGV100
Tendência Terciária de Alta - Índices Indexados U$:
82 - IVBX/FGVE/FGV100
01................06
01............................................................................................................35
36............................................................................................................70
71.......................................82
Com o objetivo de melhor expressar o estado geral do mercado, decidi fazer algumas alterações na metodologia de avaliação das forças que atuam no seu
direcionamento. Acho que não faz muito sentido, por exemplo, que uma tendência primária de baixa tenha o mesmo peso que uma tendência terciária de
baixa. Ou, que os índices de Telecomunicações e Energia, que são formados por mais de 40 ações cada, tenham o mesmo peso que os setores de
Brinquedos, Eletro-Eletrônico, etc, compostos por um reduzido número de ativos.
Sem grandes preocupações matemático-estatísticas, apenas usando um pouco de sensibilidade, passei a atribuir pesos diferenciados para algumas das
forças. Assim, se a maioria dos índices se encontra numa primária de alta ou de baixa passam a ter o valor de 10 unidades; se a maioria dos índices se
encontra numa secundária de alta ou de baixa valem 5 unidades; se a maioria dos índices se encontra numa terciária de alta ou de baixa continuam
valendo 1 ponto. Indicadores primários, como a direção das médias móveis de 200 dias, a razão entre as tendências primárias, etc. passam a ter um valor
de 5 unidades. Enfim, tudo que se referir ao primário, passa a valer 10 pontos, ao secundário 5 pontos e ao terciário 1 ponto.
BOVESPA
8
ÍÍNDIICES SETORIIAIIS
9
ÍÍNDIICES SETORIIAIIS
10
ÍÍNDIICES SETORIIAIIS
11
ÍÍNDIICES SETORIIAIIS
12
RAIIO X DA EVOLUÇÃO DAS TENDÊNCIIAS DAS AÇÕES QUE COMPÕEM O MERCADO
13
PRIINCIIPAIIS TENDÊNCIIAS DO MERCADO:: ESTATÍÍSTIICAS
BOVESPA
Participação Setorial
¨Teles:
¨ Petróleo: ¨ Energia:
¨Bancos:
Variações (%U$) (%R$)
¨Semanal 2,11 (0,76)
¨Mensal (0,53) (3,66)
¨Anual 19,90 10,52
Suportes e Resistências
¨Sup 16.451 32.767
¨Res 17.527 38.803
IBX- BRASIL
Participação Setorial
¨Teles ¨Petróleo ¨Bancos ¨Energia Variações (%U$)
¨Semanal 1,42
¨Mensal (2,62)
As tendências primárias e secundárias, sintonizadas, seguem em alta. As terciárias divergem. ¨Anual 21,69
Suportes e Resistências (U$)
¨Sup 4.426
O Princípio da Confirmação
¨Res 5.718
FGV-100 E
Participação Setorial
¨Teles
¨Energia
Variações (%U$)
¨Semanal 3,39
¨Mensal 0,44
¨Anual 19,47
Suportes e Resistências (U$)
¨Sup: 380.009
¨Res: 483.351
FGV-100
Participação Setorial
¨Teles
¨Energia
¨Mineração
¨Siderurgia
Variações (%U$)
¨Semanal 3,25
¨Mensal 0,95
¨Anual 15,15
Suportes e Resistências (U$)
¨Sup: 229.697
Os índices seguem sintonizados confirmando uns aos outros na tendência de alta e indefinidos no curto prazo.
¨Res: 262.677
14
BOVESPA VIISTO POR FORA
O Bovespa segue em tendência de alta. As médias móveis de 21 períodos do indicador de Clímax voltam a divergir. Os MACDs semanais
seguem sinalizando alta. Os estocásticos calculados sobre os dados diários encontram-se na região de mercado sobre-vendido, prontos
para voltarem a subir.
As razões das tendências primária e secundária seguem em alta.
15
IINDIICADORES DA TENDÊNCIIA DE MÉDIIO PRAZO
Þ O Bovespa e a LAD do mercado (nominal)
O Bovespa e a LAD do mercado
seguem em sintonia, confirmando um
ao outro na tendência de alta.
Þ A LAD do mercado e a sua média móvel de 200 dias (nominal)
A média móvel de 200 dias da LAD
segue sinalizando alta.
16
IINDIICADORES DA TENDÊNCIIA DE MÉDIIO PRAZO
Þ A Média Móvel de 21p do Clímax convencional do Bovespa indexado pelo U$ comercial
Os indicadores voltam a divergir.
Þ A Média Móvel de 21p do Clímax convencional do Bovespa nominal
17
LAW OF CHARTS
Telemar
Esta semana gostaria de voltar a falar da Telemar. No meu último artigo sobre ela, comentei sobre a
observação que fiz da Law Of Charts em seu gráfico diário de linha. Naquela ocasião, disse que não
tinha observado nenhuma falha da Law Of Charts num período de 2 anos. De lá para cá continuei
acompanhando e ainda não verifiquei falhas. E esta característica é da Telemar, pois já tentei rastrear
gráficos de linha de outras ações e não encontrei nenhum intacto durante tanto tempo. Para ficar bem
claro, quando digo falha estou querendo dizer que isto ocorrerá quando, ao romper o primeiro Rh (Ross
hook) no sentido contrário aos Rhs que ela já vinha fazendo e formar o segundo Rh neste novo sentido,
ela aborta esta nova direção e volta a romper os Rhs antigos. Ou seja, ao romper o primeiro Rh e
formar o segundo numa nova direção, estou dizendo que a maior probabilidade é que ela continue
neste sentido por um bom tempo formando uma razoável seqüência de Rhs. Depois daquele artigo
denominei este método de Line System (LS).
18
LAW OF CHARTS
Este gráfico compreende o período que se inicia em torno da época do meu último artigo até os dias
atuais. Nele vocês podem notar o que eu disse. Chamarei os Rhs low de Rh de alta e os Rhs high de
Rh de baixa e no gráfico eles estão indicados em azul e vermelho respectivamente. Vejam que em
agosto houve a formação de um primeiro Rh de alta que se rompido indicaria o início de uma alta. Tal
rompimento não ocorreu e a Telemar ainda formou mais um Rh de baixa. Depois ela formou novamente
um Rh de alta que dessa vez foi rompido. O teste de fogo veio em seguida. Um Rh de baixa foi formado
exatamente no mesmo nível do último Rh de baixa (ele não foi penetrado) e se ocorresse uma
penetração eu consideraria a primeira falha do método. Mas o movimento retornou para a direção que o
LS indicava e a Telemar rompeu o segundo Rh de alta como era esperado. Notem como os pontos (3)
das formações 123 high passam a ser também os TTEs (trader’s trick entry) da alta. No mês de
dezembro quando o primeiro Rh de baixa foi penetrado eu imaginei que presenciaria a primeira falha do
LS. Naquele momento o mercado estava com tudo e não esperava que a Telemar andasse na
contramão do Ibovespa. Mas vejam que desde lá a Telemar só vem caindo a despeito do mercado que
fechou o mês de janeiro acumulando expressiva alta. A idéia básica do método é a que apresentei e a
estratégia que será adotada para quem quiser operar opções (fazer travas ou day- trades por ex.) fica
por conta de cada um.
Uma ótima semana a todos,
Glauco RCA Santos
glaucoangrafer@yahoo.com.br
19
SUGESTÕES DE COMPRAS//VENDAS
ATIVO INÍCIO COMANDO ESTOPE ÚLTIMA ESTADO ALVO/RES
ALLL4 (ALLAmer Lat) 24/11/05 Comprar a 18,51 23,89 25,00 comprado
ALPA4 (Alpargatas) 24/01/06 Comprar a 79,11 78,89 81,00 comprado
ARCE3 (Arcelor) 27/01/06 Comprar a 30,01 (32,01) 33,19 34,50 comprado
ARTE4 (Kuala) Comprar a 8,61 FA 3,41
BBAS13 (Bonus BB) 21/11/05 Comprar a 13,61 27,79 29,00 comprado
BBAS3 (BCO. DO BRASIL) Comprar a 63,81 FA 57,50
BBDC3 (Bradesco) 16/01/06 Comprar a 68,81 (EJ a 68,78) 73,89 78,19 comprado
BCAL6 (Bicicleta Caloi) Comprar a 0,27 FA 0,19
BESP4 (Banespa)
BESP4 (Banespa)
02/01/06 Comprar a 333,01 (EJ a 327,11)
Comprar a 395,11
361,89
FA
385,00
E: 07/02/06 +10,63%
BRAP4 (Bradespar) 05/01/06 Comprar a 62,51 69,59 70,99 comprado
CCRO3 (CCR Rodovias) 21/11/05 Comprar a 66,11 (EB a 16,52) 20,97 19,90 E: 09/02/06 +26,93%
CEPE5 (Celpe) 23/09/05 Comprar a 12,51 (EJ a 12,21) 14,89 16,00 comprado
CGAS5 (Comgas) Comprar a 293,01 FA 269,89
CLSC6 (Celesc) Comprar a 1,79 FA 1,63
CMIG3 (Cemig) Comprar a 89,41 FA 85,30
CNFB4 (Confab) Comprar a 4,01 FA 3,89
COCE5 (Coelce)
COCE5 (Coelce)
02/12/05 Comprar a 6,81 (EJ a 6,42)
Comprar a 10,46
8,89
FA
8,90
E: 06/02/06 38,47%
CPFE3 (CPFL ENERGIA) Comprar a 31,81 FA 30,60
CSAN3 (Cosan) Comprar a 111,61 FA 108,50
CTAX4 (Contax) Comprar a 3,31 FA 3,00
DASA3 (Dasa)
DASA3 (Dasa)
20/01/06 Comprar a 50,11
Comprar a 62,11
55,39
FA
53,00
E: 06/02/06 +10,53%
DPPI4 (Ipiranga Distrb.) 09/01/06 Comprar a 40,61 42,19 43,00 comprado
DURA4 (Duratex) 08/02/06 Comprar a 37,01 33,39 36,30 comprado
ELPL4 (Eletropaulo) Comprar a 114,11 FA 108,49
ETER3 (Eternit) Comprar a 9,01 FA 8,71
FBRA4 (Fertibrás) Comprar a 29,02 FA 25,00
GOAU4 (Gerdau Metalúrgica) 12/01/06 Comprar a 50,11 52,97 54,50 comprado
GOLL4 (Gol) 30/01/06 Comprar a 68,51 62,89 67,60 comprado
GUAR4 (Guararapes) 02/01/06 Comprar a 67,51 97,89 94,00 E: 08/02/06 +45%
IDNT3 IIdéias Net) Comprar a 4,01 FA 3,00
ITSA4 (Itausa) 04/01/06 Comprar a 7,81 8,39 9,28 comprado
LAME3 (Lojas Americanas) 30/08/05 Comprar a 62,11 (EJ a 61,51) 90,89 94,00 comprado
MWET4 (Wetzel) Comprar a 6,01 FA 4,90
NATU3 (Natura) 05/01/06 Comprar a 113,01 112,19 127,50 comprado
PCAR4 (Pão de Açúcar) Comprar a 88,11 FA 79,20
PIBB11
PIBB11
03/01/05 Comprar a 48,61
Comprar a 57,31
52,89
FA
54,08
E: 08/02/06 +8,8%
PSSA3 (Porto Seguro) 13/01/06 Comprar a 26,61 28,39 31,50 comprado
RAPT4 (Randon) 27/12/05 Comprar a 7,41 8,49 9,08 comprado
RCLS4 (Recrusul) 20/01/06 Comprar a 0,26 0,21 0,39 comprado
ROMI4 (Inds. Romi) 08/12/05 Comprar a 71,51 81,89 85,00 comprado
RSID3 (Rossi Resid) Comprar a 27,61 FA 25,99
SBSP4 (Sabesp) 12/01/06 Comprar a 174,01 168,89 175,50 E: 07/02/06 (2,94%)
SDIA4 (Sadia) 03/01/06 Comprar a 7,01 (EJ a 6,83) 6,39 6,65 comprado
SGAS4 (Supergasbras) Comprar a 6,41 FA 5,36
SUBA3 (Submarino) Comprar a 52,41 FA 50,75
TAMM4 (Tam) 11/01/06 Comprar a 47,61 46,89 49,90 comprado
TCOC3 (Tele Centro Oeste) 11/11/05 Comprar a 20,61 (EJD a 19,86) 30,39 37,97 comprado
TCSL3 (Tim Part) Comprar a 8,71 FA 8,05
TDBH3 (Telef. Data Br) 19/01/06 Comprar a 0,66 0,64 0,70 comprado
TMAR5 (Telemar N L) Comprar a 66,01 FA 58,01
UBBR11 26/01/06 Comprar a 35,11 33,49 35,30 comprado
UBBR3 (Unibanco) Comprar a 18,91 (EJD a 18,68) 21,97 23,50 comprado
UNIP6 (Unipar) Comprar a 2,41 FA 2,12
WEGE4 (Weg) 09/01/06 Comprar a 8,31 7,59 7,85 comprado
As opiniões e análises aqui descritas são baseadas em estudos gráficos, estatísticos, matemáticos, não sendo, portanto, a expressão máxima da verdade. Resultados
passados não significam e/ou garantem resultados futuros. Sendo assim, não existem formas de responsabilidade por fatos não ocorridos.
Copyright – Todos os direitos Reservados – Proibida sua reprodução total ou parcial sem autorização da Timing.
20
REGIISTRO DAS OPERAÇÕES ENCERRADAS EM 2006
ATIVO COMPRA VENDA DATA ESTOPE DATA VARIAÇÃO* ORIGEM**
AMBV4 888,48 22/12//05 859,89 02/01/06 (3,33%) AD
BBDC4 57,34 01/11/05 67,39 02/01/06 17,52% AD
GGBR4 34,51 05/12/05 37,89 02/01/06 9,79% AD
CSNA3 44,21 01/11/05 48,69 02/01/06 10,13% AD
USIM5 48,01 17/11/05 54,97 02/01/06 14,49% AD
BBDC3 54,04 01/11/05 62,89 02/01/06 16,37% SC
GOAU4 45,11 06/12/05 46,39 02/01/06 2,83% SC
GOLL4 45,21 10/11/05 64,89 03/01/06 43,53% SC
AMBV4 888,48 22/12//05 868,97 02/01/06 (2,19%) SC
TRPL3 26,37 14/09/05 30,29 06/01/06 14,86% SC
USIM5 45,56 17/11/05 52,97 02/01/06 16,26% AI
BBDC4 67,49 02/01/06 72,31 04/01/06 (7,14%) AI
CSNA3 44,21 01/11/05 48,69 02/01/06 10,13% AI
AMBV4 888,48 22/12//05 868,97 02/01/06 (2,19%) AI
GGBR4 35,01 06/12/05 37,89 02/01/06 8,22% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 06/01/06
NETC4 0,91 06/09/05 1,03 09/01/06 13,18% AD
TSPP4 8,51 02/12/05 11,09 10/01/06 30,31% AD
BRKM5 17,51 11/01/06 16,89 12/01/06 (3,54%) AD
TMCP4 4,51 05/12/05 5,17 13/01/06 14,63% AD
EBTP3 5,01 10/11/05 5,39 10/01/06 7,58% SC
UBBR11 24,16 03/11/05 31,59 10/01/06 30,75% SC
EBTP4 6,31 07/12/05 6,39 10/01/06 1,26% AI
GGBR4 39,33 03/01/06 39,97 10/01/06 1,62% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 13/01/06
TRPL4 27,40 08/01/06 27,29 17/01/06 (0,40%) AD
ACES4 28,91 03/01/06 31,89 18/01/06 10,30% AD
PTIP4 27,34 02/12/05 28,87 18/01/06 5,96% AD
PETR4 37,11 02/01/06 41,89 18/01/06 12,88% AD
GGBR4 39,41 03/01/06 39,59 18/01/06 0,45% AD
CSNA3 50,71 04/01/06 52,89 18/01/06 4,29% AD
ELET6 39,61 03/01/06 41,79 20/01/06 5,50% AD
TCOC4 35,21 12/01/06 31,79 20/01/06 (9,71%) AD
TBLE3 16,01 16/01/06 14,89 20/01/06 (6,99%) AD
ALPA4 50,51 17/11/05 74,89 17/01/06 48,26% SC
PCAR4 77,61 28/12/05 81,49 17/01/06 4,99% SC
RSID3 1,17 07/11/05 3,09 18/01/06 164,10% SC
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 20/01/06
CMIG3 74,60 03/01/06 83,39 23/01/06 11,78% AD
CMIG4 89,60 03/01/06 101,89 23/01/06 13,71% AD
TLCP4 36,21 03/01/06 39,89 23/01/06 10,16% AD
VALE3 101,01 04/01/06 105,89 23/01/06 4,83% AD
AMBV4 907,61 04/01/06 899,97 23/01/06 (0,84%) AD
CMIG3 63,50 03/11/05 83,39 23/01/06 31,32% SC
IDNT3 2,71 13/01/06 3,09 24/01/06 14,02% SC
BBAS3 45,01 04/01/06 51,97 27/01/06 15,46% AD
BBAS3 45,01 04/01/06 52,29 27/01/06 16,17% SC
MTSA4 99,03 06/12/05 110,00 27/01/06 11,07% SC
TSPP4 9,51 03/01/06 10,59 23/01/06 11,35% AI
CMIG4 71,32 03/12/05 101,89 23/01/06 42,86% AI
AMBV4 907,61 04/01/06 899,89 23/01/06 (0,85%) AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 27/01/06
ELET6 40,31 03/01/06 43,09 30/01/06 6,89% AD
21
BRKM5 17,61 18/01/06 17,09 31/01/06 (2,95%) AD
CESP4 15,01 09/01/06 18,39 31/01/06 22,51% AD
LIGH3 16,61 23/02/06 15,09 31/01/06 (9,15%) AD
TCSL3 6,63 12/12/05 7,69 01/02/06 15,98% AD
TCSL4 4,83 17/11/05 7,59 01/02/06 57,14% AD
PETR3 41,61 02/01/06 48,97 02/02/06 17,68% AD
PETR4 44,11 20/01/06 44,69 02/02/06 1,31% AD
CLSC6 1,61 16/01/06 1,61 02/02/06 - AD
BRAP4 62,51 05/01/06 72,39 02/02/06 15,5% AD
GGBR4 42,01 19/01/06 45,59 03/02/06 8,52% AD
CMET4 3,81 05/01/06 3,66 03/02/06 -3,93% AD
VALE5 88,31 04/01/06 91,69 03/02/06 2,98% AD
AMBV3 681,26 18/11/05 768,89 31/01/06 12,86% SC
CAFE4 1,81 12/01/06 1,69 30/01/06 -6,82% SC
CPFE3 24,28 03/11/05 29,89 03/01/06 23,1% SC
DURA4 27,61 14/12/05 34,69 30/01/06 25,64% SC
GRND3 23,51 18/01/06 22,97 31/01/06 -2,29% SC
SAPR4 2,31 12/01/06 2,34 01/02/06 1,29% SC
TCSL3 6,73 12/12/05 7,69 01/01/06 14,26% SC
VALE5 88,31 04/01/06 91,59 03/02/06 3,71% AI
ELET6 40,31 03/01/06 42,39 31/01/06 5,16% AI
CMET4 3,81 05/01/06 3,66 03/02/06 -3,93% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 03/02/06
SBSP3 181,11 19/01/06 168,89 07/02/06 -6,74% AD
USIM5 56,11 20/01/06 64,39 07/02/06 14,75% AD
VALE3 110,81 27/01/06 104,89 07/02/06 -5,34% AD
ITAU4 59,58 04/01/06 63,69 08/02/06 6,89% AD
EMBR3 20,01 08/01/06 19,89 08/02/06 -0,6% AD
BESP4 327,11 02/01/06 361,89 07/02/06 10,63% SC
CCRO3 16,52 21/11/05 20,97 09/02/06 26,93% SC
COCE5 6,42 02/12/05 8,89 06/02/06 38,47% SC
DASA3 50,11 20/01/06 55,39 06/02/06 10,53% SC
GUAR4 67,51 02/01/06 97,89 08/02/06 45% SC
PIBB11 48,61 03/01/05 52,89 08/02/05 8,8% SC
SBSP3 174,01 12/01/06 168,89 07/02/06 -2,94% SC
PETR4 37,11 02/01/06 41,59 01/02/06 12,07% AI
CSNA3 57,47 27/01/06 56,29 08/02/06 -2,05% AI
SEMANA ENCERRADA EM 10/02/06
*Variação Bruta: não está incluída nenhuma despesa.
**AD: operação sugerida na planilha das análises diárias; SC: operação sugerida na seção das Sugestões de Compra/Venda da revista;
AI: operações sugeridas na seção das Análises Individuais da revista.
22
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Petrobrás em Real (PETR4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 9,227%)
Suportes
¨MP: 7,06
¨CP: 41/39/35,46/34,48/32,36
Resistências
¨MP: 47,30
¨CP: 43,5/45,45
Objetivo: alta 47,3; baixa 28,86
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371, foi
estopado na compra (02/01/06) feita a
37,61 (EJ a 37,11) em 41,59 (10/02/06)
com um lucro de 12,07%.
Comprar a 47,41 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
23
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Usiminas em Real (USIM5 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 5,593%)
Suportes
¨MP: 20,05
¨CP: 62,6/53,81/52,5/51,94/49,37/47,6
Resistências
¨MP: 74,67
¨CP: 74,67
Objetivos: alta 74,67; baixa 38,64
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371, segue
comprado (26/01/06) a 63,81. Suba o seu
estope para 62,49. Se vier a ser estopado,
apenas encerre a operação.
Þ Bradesco pn em Real (BBDC4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 3,777%)
Suportes
¨MP: 10,01
¨CP: 75,81/74,96/70,27/65,61/62,65
Resistências
¨MP: 89,06
¨CP: 89,06
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 65,47
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371, segue
comprado (19/01/06) a 76,61. Suba o seu
estope 78,19. Se vier a ser estopado,
apenas encerre a operação.
Se depois que tiver sido estopado o preço
voltar a subir, recompre na ultrapassagem
do topo histórico e coloque um estope
inicial um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
24
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Telemar pn em Real (TNLP4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 8,117%
Suportes
¨MP: 15,81
¨CP: 36,86/35,23/33,08/32,72
Resistências
¨MP: 45,44
¨CP: 41/41,95/43,45
Objetivos: Alta 45,44; Baixa 33,08
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
continua fora do mercado.
Continuarei aguardando mais
desdobramento para montagem de novas
estratégias.
Þ Telesp Celular Part. pn em Real (TSPP4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 1,414%)
Suportes
¨MP: 5,89
¨CP: `10,45/8,4/7,3/6,36
Resistências
¨MP: 101,83
¨CP: 11,96/12,34/13,17/16,31/19,37
Objetivo: alta 19,37; baixa 5,89
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
continua fora do mercado..
Comprar a 12,01 e coloque um estope
inicial um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
25
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Vale do Rio Doce em Real (VALE5 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 8,095%)
Suportes
¨MP: 2,76
¨CP: 86,98/82/79,67/77,71/74/72,5
Resistências
¨MP: 97,99
¨CP: 92,00
Objetivo: 97,99 ?; baixa 74,00
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 98,01 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ Siderúrgica Nacional ON em Real (CSNA3 – PESO NO BOVESPA: (4,23%)
Suportes
¨MP: 23,29
¨CP: 50,76/45,84/44,9/43,5/41,82
Resistências
¨MP: 63,31
¨CP: 63,31
Objetivos: alta 63,31; baixa 37,10
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371, foi
estopado na compra (27/01/06) feita a
61,11 (EJ a 57,47) em 56,29 (08/02/06)
com um custo de 2,05%.
Comprar a 63,41 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
26
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Eletrobrás em Real (ELET6 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,755%)
Suportes
¨MP: 10,71
¨CP: 39,65/38,66/37,11/36,5/33,3
Resistências
¨MP: 46,20
¨CP: 42,84
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 36,59
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 46,31 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ Embratel pn em Real (EBTP4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,188%)
Suportes
¨MP: 1,14
¨CP: 5,16/5,03/4,84/4,46/4,22
Resistências
¨MP: 43,92
¨CP: 5,78/5,91/6,59/6,89/7,08/7,24/7,7
Objetivo: alta 7,08 baixa: 3,42
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
continua fora do mercado.
Continuarei aguardando um pouco mais
desdobramento para montagem de novas
estratégias.
``
27
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Caemi pn em Real (CMET4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 4,128%)
Suportes
¨MP: 0,86
¨CP: 3,26/3,22/3,16/3,07/2,73/2,62
Resistências
¨MP: 3,98
¨CP: 3,98
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 3,26
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 4,01 com um estope inicial um
pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ Itaú pn em Real (ITAU4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,77%)
Suportes
¨MP: 21,25
¨CP: 63,1/62,22/60,27/54,18/53,83
Resistências
¨MP: 69,55
¨CP: 69,55
Objetivo: alta 69,55; baixa 48,12
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371, segue
comprado (04/01/06) a 59,61 (EJ a 59,58).
Suba o seu estope para 62,97.
Se vier a ser estopado e logo após o preço
voltar a subir, recompre na ultrapassagem
do topo histórico e coloque um estope
inicial um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
28
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Cemig pn em Real (CMIG4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,328%)
Suportes
¨MP: 30,69
¨CP: 100/98/85,52/81,13/77,04/73,56
Resistências
¨MP: 109,80
¨CP: 109,80
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 74,09
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 110,01 com estope inicial um
pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ AmBev/Braskem em Real (BRKM5 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,914%)
Suportes
¨MP: 407,95
¨CP: 852,01/849,91/822,1/786,52/739
Resistências
¨MP: 965,00
¨CP: 944,99
Objetivo: alta 965; baixa 739
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 965,11 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
29
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Brasil Telecom pn (BRTO4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,208%)
Suportes
¨MP: 5,58
¨CP: 9,31//8,58/7,78
Resistências
¨MP: 15,84
¨CP: 10,64/10,72/12,8/15,84
Objetivo: alta 15,84; baixa 7,78
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 10,81 com estope inicial um
pouco abaixo do fundo anterior..
Þ Net pn (PLIM4 – PESO NO BOVESPA: 2,176%)
Suportes
¨MP: 0,13
¨CP: 1,06/1,03/1,02/0,94/0,85/0,82
Resistências
¨MP: 31,10
¨CP: 1,21/1,29/2,78
Objetivo: alta 30,79; baixa 0,51
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
segue comprado (24/01/06) a 1,18.
Mantenha um estope em 1,05. Se vier a
ser estopado, apenas encerre a operação.
30
ANÁLIISES IINDIIVIIDUAIIS
Þ Gerdau pn (GGBR4 –PESO NO BOVESPA 3,512%)
Suportes
¨MP: 2,40
¨CP: 43,19/40,6/39,51/37,6/36,4/33,5
Resistências
¨MP: 48,85
¨CP: 46,25/46,9
Objetivo: alta ?; baixa 27,12
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371, segue
comprado (19/01/06) a 42,01. Suba o seu
estope para 42,97. Se vier a ser estopado,
apenas encerre a operação.
Se depois de estopado o preço voltar a
subir, recompre na ultrapassagem do topo
histórico e coloque um estope inicial um
pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ Futuro do Bovespa
Tendências
¨Primária: ALTA
¨Secundária: ALTA
¨Terciária: BAIXA
Suportes: 36260/35600/35020/33270
Resistências: 38930/41535
Comentário
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371, foi
estopado na compra feita a 36010 em
36340 com um lucro de 0,91% e está fora
do mercado.
Comprar a 38960 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
31
IINTER--RELAÇÕES DE MERCADOS COM O BOVESPA
Þ Dow Jones
Tendências
¨Primária: ALTA
¨Secundária: ALTA
¨Terciária: INDEFINIDA
Suportes
¨MP: 7197
¨CP:10737/10661/10652/10519/10388
Resistências
¨MP: 11750
¨CP: 10968/11048/11350
Comentário
O DJ continua indefinido e deve
permanecer mais algum tempo se
movendo lateralmente.
Observação: na maior parte do tempo,
o DJ e o Bovespa costumam caminhar
na mesma direção.
Þ Nasdaq Composite
Tendências
¨Primária: ALTA
¨Secundária: INDEFINIDA
¨Terciária: INDEFINIDA
Suportes
¨MP: 1253
¨CP: 2245/2190/2163/2064/2026/1944
Resistências
¨MP: 5.133
¨CP: 2314/2328/2892
Comentário
O Nasdaq segue corrigindo dentro da
tendência de alta e deve voltar a subir
rumo aos 2300.
Observação: no geral, o NASDAQ e o
Bovespa tendem a caminhar na mesma
direção.
32
IINTER--RELAÇÕES DE MERCADOS COM O BOVESPA
Þ Ouro Spot (BM&F)
Tendências
¨Primária: ALTA
¨Secundária: BAIXA
¨Terciária: BAIXA
Suportes
¨MP: 20,50
¨CP: 38,2/36,5/35,4/35/32,2
Resistências
¨MP: 43,80
¨CP: 39,6/41,25/41,60
Comentário
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 43,91 com um estope inicial
um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior..
Observação: o preço do Ouro costuma
se mover na direção inversa do
Bovespa, sendo por isso considerado
contra-cíclico.
Þ Eurodólar
Tendências
¨Primária: BAIXA
¨Secundária: ALTA
¨Terciária: BAIXA
Suportes
¨MP: 0,8228
¨CP: 1,189/1,18/1,164/1,138/1,08
Resistências
¨MP: 1,367
¨CP: 1,219/1,233/1,246/1,259
Comentário
Se seguiu as instruções da RV371,
continua fora do mercado.
Continuarei aguardando mais
desdobramento para montagem de novas
estratégias.
33
IINTER--RELAÇÕES DE MERCADOS COM O BOVESPA
Þ Futuro do Petróleo (crude oil light)
Tendências
¨Primária: INDEFINIDA
¨Secundária: INDEFINIDA
¨Terciária: BAIXA
Suportes
¨MP: 25,04
¨CP: 61,2/57,3/55,72/52,22
Resistências
¨MP: 70,85
¨CP: 63,7/66,82/69,20
Comentário
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
continua fora do mercado.
Comprar a 71,01 e coloque um estope
inicial um pouco abaixo do fundo anterior.
Þ Futuro do Dólar
Tendências
¨Primária: BAIXA
¨Secundária: BAIXA
¨Terciária: BAIXA
Suportes
¨MP: 2157,00
¨CP: 2157,00
Resistências
¨MP: 6103,83
¨CP: 2219,5/2254/2366,33/2404,77
Estratégias
Se seguiu as estratégias da RV371,
vendeu a 2210,89 e segue vendido.
Abaixe o seu estope para 2220,11.
Observação: normalmente, anda na
contra-mão do Bovespa.
As opiniões e análises aqui descritas são baseadas em estudos gráficos, estatísticos, matemáticos, não sendo, portanto, a expressão máxima da verdade. Resultados
passados não significam e/ou garantem resultados futuros. Sendo assim, não existem formas de responsabilidade por fatos não ocorridos.
Copyright – Todos os direitos Reservados – Proibida sua reprodução total ou parcial sem autorização da Timing.

Gold rallies to 25-year high, sentiment
still positive
 ut underlying justifications for rise
weak; market vulnerable to correction
Huge inflows into exchange traded
funds may make it different this time
The gold price has surged higher in the past six months, up
almost USD150/oz from the July lows and currently trading
at USD567/oz, the highest level since 1981. All of the rise
can be attributed to speculator and investor buying of
bullion: the underlying fundamentals of supply and demand
have deteriorated as the sharp rise in price has depressed
demand and encouraged supplies, particularly scrap.
Nevertheless, sentiment towards gold remains very positive
and further gains are widely expected. While sentiment is so
strong, it would be foolish to fight the trend in prices.
However, we would caution that while some of the reasons
for the renewed speculative interest in gold hold water, some
do not. The situation in the Middle East is a concern, and
who knows what will happen with Iran’s nuclear ambitions?
Despite higher oil prices, inflation has surprised by its
weakness, not its strength and there have been no (publicly
declared) central bank purchases of gold. The dollar is
expected to decline, although this is arguably reflected in the
gold price already.
Against this background we remain concerned that gold
prices have rallied too far, too quickly (in common with
other metals) and that this makes the market(s) vulnerable to
a downward correction. Given our longer-term view of gold,
we would look to buy into any price weakness. We like gold,
but not at this price.
The one difference that may make the huge speculative
interest in gold justifiable is the surge in holdings of gold at
the various exchange traded funds (ETFs). Total gold
holdings now stand at 400t, with the pace of inflows in the
past two months enough to offset sales of gold from the
European central banks. If the ETFs continue to attract
inflows at this rate, the outlook for gold will be more bullish
than our base case forecast of USD520/oz allows for. For
now, we prefer to err on the side of caution.
Macro
Commodities
HSBC Gold Outlook
27 January 2006
Alan Williamson
Head of Commodities Research
+44 207 991 5954 alan.williamson@hsbcib.com
Disclaimer and Disclosures
This report must be read with the
disclosures and the analyst
certifications in the Disclosure
appendix, and with the Disclaimer, that
form part of it.



Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


Overview and summary
Having lagged the rest of the metals complex for
much of last year, gold prices surged higher in the
final few weeks of 2005 and have remained strong
in early 2006. Prices soared to a new high of
USD567/oz, a level last seen in 1981, and up over
USD100/oz in the last two months. Sentiment
towards gold remains overwhelmingly positive.
For once the rally in gold has not simply mirrored
a move lower in the dollar. Rather, gold has
rallied independent of developments in the
currency markets. Indeed, through the second half
of last year, gold was rallying alongside the
dollar, leading to a higher surge in prices in non-
US dollar currencies.
In our view, the force behind the move higher has
been renewed speculative and investment buying
of gold. Initially, this has been on the Comex gold
futures contract, then on Tocom and, more
recently, in the range of gold exchange-traded
funds (ETFs) that allow investors exposure to the
bullion price through a stock market-listed
product. By contrast, fabrication demand has
weakened sharply in response to the surge in
prices. Jewellery offtake is running at some 15-
20% below year-ago levels.
Explaining the surge in investor
interest
There have been a number of reasons proffered
for the surge in speculative interest in gold and the
rally in prices: a high oil price and a rise in
inflationary expectations, improvements in the
underlying physical market, comments made by
central bankers regarding the need to diversify
dollar holdings and, more recently, worries over
Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Some of these hold
water – who knows what will happen in the
Middle East – most, however, do not. Inflation
has surprised by its weakness, not its strength, and
there have been no significant central bank
purchases of gold (at least that we know of).
Against a background where the traditional
drivers of gold have taken something of a back
seat, it is almost impossible to forecast gold
prices. In an environment where many investors
(and analysts) claim “it’s different this time,” any
gold price can be plausibly argued for. In the
recent LBMA survey of precious metal price
forecasts, for example, the range of forecasts was
 Gold rally continues as speculative buying surges
 Traditional drivers break down, no longer a straight dollar play
 Market very vulnerable to a correction lower
Actual and forecast gold prices
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006f 2007f 2008fLong term
Gold USD/oz 294 282 280 271 309 363 409 445 520 550 500 400
Source: HSBC estimates


3
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


from a low of USD470/oz, to a high of
USD618/oz. However, we would caution that an
increase in the average annual gold price of more
than USD75/oz (which would take gold from last
year’s USD445/oz to USD520/oz this year) has
not been seen since 1979-80, an unusual period in
economic and financial history that we do not see
being repeated. With huge speculative positions in
the market at present, we believe that a sharp fall
in prices point is inevitable. Caveat emptor.
Our gold price forecast for this year is for an
average of USD520/oz, some USD40/oz below
the current spot price. Indeed, for the first time
since the gold rally began in 2001, we actually
find ourselves arguing for a lower price this year
than the current spot price. Having been towards
the bullish end of forecasts over recent years, why
are we suddenly so (relatively) bearish on prices?
The short answer is we aren’t. We continue to
favour the gold market, and believe the bull run,
which began in 2001, should continue through
this year and into 2007, helped by a declining US
dollar, slowing global growth and increasing
investor desire for asset diversification. Indeed, of
all the metals, gold is the only major metal we see
rising next year (USD550/oz) compared with this
year. Price spikes above USD600/oz and towards
USD700/oz are distinct possibilities.
Our problem is not with the direction of prices,
but the speed with which prices have surged – up
over USD100/oz in the last two months. Our
worry is that, if and when the gold price rally
stops being largely momentum-driven (and the
market realises this), gold could be subject to a
severe correction lower.
But it’s different this time
The one change that the gold bulls can rightly
point to is the surge in inflows into ETFs – up
108t (3.5moz since the end of the third quarter).
We believe the increase in gold holdings at ETFs
has helped improve sentiment towards bullion.
Perception has it that the inflows reflect long-term
investment, and are unlikely to be reversed in a
period of weaker prices, a contention with which
it is difficult to disagree, but which remains
untested in a declining price environment. If ETFs
continue to attract inflows on a scale seen over
recent months, then we would happily concede
the market has changed and revisit our forecasts.
Until there is further evidence that this is the case,
we err on the side of caution.
Trading versus investment
In short, there is a different approach to the gold
market required from traders and investors. From
a trading point of view, the strength of the price
action over recent weeks and months is very
difficult to argue against. For whatever reason,
gold is going up and will continue to do so while
sentiment is so strong. Whether it peaks tomorrow
at USD570/oz, next week at USD600/oz or
whenever, at whatever price, short-term
momentum favours being long. The advantage of
a trading position is, of course, it can be liquidated
if and when the market loses momentum.
From a longer-term investment point of view,
however, we would argue that there will be better
entry points to get into the gold market than at a
price that is up over USD100/oz in the last two
months and at a level that few thought achievable
six months ago. Whether the price path means
gold averages USD520/oz this year (or
USD500/oz or USD540/oz) is, quite frankly,
impossible to foretell. But given the large
speculative positions in the market at present, our
key conclusion is that a sharp fall in prices at
some point is inevitable. This would provide a
better entry point to the gold rally, which we
expect to continue into 2007, than current nearrecord
prices.


4
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


Recent market trends
As has been the case in recent years, the gold
market showed little clear direction in H1 2005,
generally trading in a USD410-445/oz range, with
price movements generally mirroring
developments in the currency markets. Periods of
dollar strength saw gold under pressure, most
notably following the French and Dutch rejections
of the EU Constitution, while periods of dollar
weakness allowed gold to move to the top end of
its trading range.
Dollar/gold broke down in H2 2005…
All of this changed in the second half of the year.
Although the dollar remained strong, rallying to a
near-two-year high of 1.164 against the euro in
November, gold broke free of the currency
markets with prices rallying sharply higher. From
a low of USD417/oz in July, prices moved higher
to trade in a USD457-480/oz range for much of
the third quarter. Prices broke out of this trading
range in mid-November, surging to a high of
USD541/oz. After a brief correction lower, with
prices falling back to a low of USD489/oz in mid-
December, the bull market in gold has since
resumed with full vigour. Prices have surged
higher, reaching a 25-year high of USD567/oz in
mid-January. Sentiment towards gold remains
overwhelmingly positive, not least because of
widespread expectations that the dollar is set to
decline this year. After all, if gold can rally in a
strong dollar environment, just imagine what it
Gold prices 1970-2006 Gold prices 2004-06
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Jan-70 Jan-80 Jan-90 Jan-00
USD/oz
370
400
430
460
490
520
550
Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06
USD/oz
Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream
Gold and the dollar going separate ways
300
350
400
450
500
550
Jul-02 Jan-03 Jul-03 Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06
0.93
1.07
1.21
1.35
1.49
1.63
Gold (LHS) USD/EUR (RHS)
USD/oz
USD/EUR
Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream


5
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


could do in a weak dollar environment.
…or did it?
The argument that the relationship between gold
and the dollar broke down in H2 2005 would
imply that currency movements had no impact on
the gold price. In fact, this was not the case. The
negative correlation between gold and the dollar
did not break down – it reversed, such that
through H2 2005, a rising dollar coincided with a
rising gold price. The rise in the dollar or, more
specifically, the fall in other currencies, had a
marked impact on activity in the gold market.
Nowhere was this more obvious than in Japan.
For much of 2003, 2004 and H2 2005, the gold
price in yen terms was relatively flat, generally
trading in a ¥1,300-1,500/g range. Not
surprisingly, any rallies saw increased selling,
while any dips saw investor buying. This helped
reinforce the trading range. In H2 2005, gold
prices in yen terms rallied higher, as the (dollardenominated)
gold price increased and as the Yen
weakened. Local prices increased by almost 50%,
to an 18-year high of ¥2,100/g. With Japanese
investors looking to hedge any further currency
weakness, and at the same time shield gains made
on the booming local stock market, appetite for
bullion exposure increased sharply. Open interest
on the Tocom gold contract surged higher.
A reversal of fortunes
However, as the yen appreciated at the end of the
year, this virtuous circle of rising prices and
speculative buying turned into a vicious circle of
falling prices and speculative selling. Such was
Gold and the dollar became positively correlated in H2 2005
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
USDUSD/oz
USD/EUR
January 2001 - June 2005
July 2005 - January 2006
Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream
Gold prices in euros surged higher in H2 2005 ... as did prices in yen
300
330
360
390
420
450
480
Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06
EUR/oz
1350
1500
1650
1800
1950
2100
Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06
Yen/g
Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream


6
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


the selling pressure, that prices on Tocom
frequently fell by their daily limit, effectively
closing the market and reducing the ability of
local investors to exit long positions. The Tocom
management committee widened the allowable
daily price range, facilitating the longs exit from
the market, but only after liquidation contributed
to the slump in prices back to USD480/oz.
Looking forward, we continue to expect the dollar
to weaken. As we discuss in greater detail below, as
the currency markets focus once again on the
structural story of a widening trade deficit, rather
than the cyclical story of higher US rates which
benefited the greenback through 2005. Common
perception has it that a declining dollar must be
good for gold. However, as the Japanese experience
showed in November and December, a weakening
dollar does not necessarily imply higher gold prices,
if this encourages local long liquidation.
Speculative and investment buying
has driven the rally
In our view, the force behind the move higher in
gold has been renewed speculative and investment
buying of gold. Initially the move higher was led
by increased activity on the Comex gold contract,
with the total speculative long position increasing
from a low of 5.3moz in July to a record high of
over 21.3moz in early October. This accounted for
much of the increase in gold prices from the July
lows of USD418/oz to the October highs of
USD480/oz. As we noted above, for once, fund
enthusiasm for gold was not a reflection of a
dollar view. For much of the second half of last
year, funds were running with net long positions
in both gold and the dollar. The most recent data
show the net long dollar position has reverted to
being short, principally through the building of
long euro positions.
Through much of the fourth quarter, the net long
position on the Comex gold contract was little
changed at the historically very high level of 18-
21moz. The move higher in gold was principally
driven higher by more aggressive buying on
Tocom. This took the market to the highs of the
year, although as the stronger yen encouraged the
liquidation of long positions in December, so the
gold price pulled back.
ETFs to the fore
More recently, increased investments in the range
of exchange traded funds (ETFs), which allow
investors exposure to the bullion market through a
stock market listed product, has helped the market
to rally to the highs of over USD550/oz. Total
gold holdings currently stand at an impressive
399t, valued at USD7.2bn at a price of
USD560/oz, with over 119t (3.8moz) added since
Speculative gold holdings: net long positions on Comex and gold holdings at ETFs
300
350
400
450
500
550
Jul-03 Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06
US$/oz
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
Moz
Gold in ETFs (RHS) ’Total speculativ e position on Comex - RHS Gold price - LHS
Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream, CFTC, Gold Bullion, iShares


7
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


the end of the third quarter. By contrast, the net
long position on the Comex gold contract has
been little changed, and is some 3moz off the
October highs.
Explaining the surge in
investor interest
There have been a number of reasons proffered
for the surge in speculative interest in gold and the
rally in prices: a high oil price and a rise in
inflationary expectations, improvements in the
underlying physical market, comments made by
central bankers regarding the need to diversify
dollar holdings and more recently worries over
Iranian nuclear ambitions. Some of these hold
water – who knows what will happen in the
Middle East – most, however, do not.
There is, as we discuss later, little evidence that
higher oil prices are feeding through to higher
inflation, nor is there any evidence in other
financial markets that inflation is a worry. While
the underlying physical market was strong in the
first half, it weakened markedly in the second, as
the surging gold price had a dampening impact on
physical demand. Some central bankers have
made encouraging statements regarding the need
to diversify reserves, although as yet the list of
actual purchasers of gold is limited to the Central
Bank of Argentina. And, purchases continue to be
dwarfed by ongoing European sales.
ElecTriFying
The one change that the gold bulls can rightly
point to is the surge in inflows into the ETFs.
Undoubtedly the increase in gold holdings at the
ETFs has helped improve sentiment towards gold.
Perception has it that the inflows reflect long term
investment, and are unlikely to be reversed in a
period of weaker prices, a contention with which
it is difficult to disagree with, but which remains
untested in a declining price environment.
Nevertheless, for whatever reason, speculative
interest in gold remains at a very high level and
the price has surged. In turn this will have an
impact on the market itself. While before the
surge higher consumers would have waited for a
pull back in prices to, say the USD430/oz level,
now, with a price up USD100/oz, they are likely
to emerge at a much higher price level.
Is there another buyer?
The increase in visible net long gold holdings
over recent weeks is somewhat lower than the
surge in prices would suggest. This has led to
speculation that there is another large buyer in the
market – possibly a central bank. To date, there is
no evidence that this is the case. We would also
For once the fund net long position in gold has not reflected a bearish dollar view
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Dec-02 Jul-03 Dec-03 Jun-04 Dec-04 Jun-05 Dec-05
US$ Billions
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
’Total speculativ e position on Comex - RHS IMM net dollar position (LHS)
Million ounces
Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream, CFTC, Gold Bullion, iShares


8
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


note that in the recent price rise, there has been
very little selling, thereby allowing the price to
rise faster than has been the case previously.
The macroeconomic outlook
Somewhat strangely, the recent strength in gold
prices has actually come against a background of
increased confidence in the global economic
outlook. This has been reflected in upwards
revisions to economic forecasts, and the ongoing
strength in global equity prices. As such, our
global economics team has recently revisited their
forecasts for 2005 and 2006, a summary of which
is shown in the table below. We have raised our
forecasts for global economic growth. Although
we continue to believe the global economy
remains vulnerable to a slowdown in consumer
spending, we do not expect this until 2007. As a
consequence we have raised our forecast for
global GDP growth from +3.5% year-on-year, to
+4.2% year-on-year.
The New World Order
The following is a précis of our Q1 2005 Global
Economics Outlook.
Welcome to the new world economic order. In the
old days, the US and Europe dominated the
economic landscape. Not any more. The big
growth surprises are happening elsewhere,
notably in China, India and a resurgent Japan.
And their economic success, in turn, is leading to
new challenges for western industrialised nations,
notably higher energy prices and lower wages.
Nor is this a straightforward economic race
between old money and the nouveau riche. The
degree of economic integration is extraordinarily
high by past standards. Economic linkages are
spreading far and wide: whether through trade,
capital flows or labour migration, the new world
order is fundamentally different from the old.
For western policymakers, these changes are
creating new challenges. Second-round wage
effects stemming from higher energy prices are
simply not materialising. The path for energy
prices itself is becoming increasingly uncertain.
And it’s becoming difficult to assess the
appropriate objective for price stability. Shortterm
interest rates will rise further in the US and
Europe, and Japan will bring its zero interest rate
policy to an end in 2006. However, the link
between these monetary decisions and broader
economic and financial developments is, in our
view, becoming increasingly tenuous.
HSBC economics forecasts
________________ GDP growth - _________________ ___________Industrial production growth ___________
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005f 2006f 2007f 2001 2002 2003 2004f 2005f 2006f 2007f
US 0.8 1.9 3.0 4.2 3.5 3.3 2.4 -3.6 -0.3 0.0 4.1 3.0 3.5 2.6
Japan 0.4 0.1 1.8 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.6 -6.8 -1.2 3.2 5.5 1.3 5.3 3.2
Germany 1.4 0.1 -0.2 1.1 1.1 1.5 0.8 -0.4 -1.2 0.1 2.4 2.6 2.4 1.2
France 2.1 1.3 0.9 2.1 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.0 -2.0 -0.9 2.2 0.3 1.5 1.6
Italy 1.7 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.2 1.3 0.6 -0.9 -1.1 -1.1 -0.6 -0.8 1.4 0.2
UK 2.2 2.0 2.5 3.2 1.7 1.8 2.4 -1.6 -2.5 -0.2 0.5 -0.4 1.0 2.4
EU 25 1.9 1.1 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.9 1.6 -0.1 -0.9 0.0 1.5 0.6 1.6 1.4
South Korea 3.8 7.0 3.1 4.6 3.9 5.1 4.5 0.7 8.1 5.0 10.4 5.4 6.2 5.5
Taiwan -2.2 4.2 3.4 6.1 3.8 3.8 4.0 -7.3 6.4 5.5 9.8 2.7 4.8 5.0
China 7.5 8.3 9.5 9.5 9.3 8.9 7.5 8.7 10.0 12.7 11.4 11.1 10.6 6.9
G7 1.1 1.3 2.1 3.1 2.6 2.6 2.1 -3.0 -0.7 0.4 3.3 1.9 3.0 2.2
World 2.4 2.8 3.9 4.7 4.2 4.2 3.7 -0.3 2.0 3.3 5.5 4.0 4.8 3.7
Source: HSBC estimates


9
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


US – a 2006 upgrade
We thought the housing bubble would have
punctured by now, but it hasn’t. There have been
anecdotes galore suggesting it is ‘topping out’, but
home sales are at record highs, and partly as a
result, consumption is strong. So although home
equity loans have stalled, which will moderate
consumption, the housing wealth effect will be a
support for a while. Meanwhile, profits are strong,
so capital spending should be good.
Overall, then, we see GDP at 3.3% in 2006, and
with core PCE inflation set to be low at 1.5% in
2006, there’s a good chance Fed funds peaks at
4.75%. But special factors like pension fund
demand and foreign buying may keep 10-year
rates low, inverting the yield curve through most
of 2006. Longer term, we think that the imminent
crackdown on ‘exotic’ mortgages and a sobering
of home price expectations will mean flat or
falling nationwide home prices soon, a collapse in
home sales later in 2006, soft GDP growth in
2007, forcing the Fed to ease from early 2007.
Eurozone – China in your hands
We have been surprised by the strength of activity
in the eurozone over recent months and have
revised up our 2006 growth forecast considerably
from 1.3% to 1.8%. This puts us roughly in line
with consensus for the first time in a long time,
although we expect growth to surprise on the
downside again in 2007 and have cut our forecast
to just 1.4%.
The recent improvement is most likely to reflect
another export-led upturn, with the lagged effects
of the oil price rise and ongoing structural
obstacles meaning that a strong, self-sustaining
domestic recovery will remain elusive.
Inflation is also unlikely to provide much of a
problem from here. While headline inflation has
often led the core rate in the past, several factors
should ensure it doesn’t happen this time. These
include the cumulative weakness of demand and
the greater power of the corporate sector. With the
energy contribution set to fall sharply from the
spring, we expect headline inflation to drop below
2% from mid-2006.
Japan – more sustainable growth
The economy has been growing steadily, and the
expansion will pass the four-year mark in
February, making it easily the longest one in the
post-Bubble period. All signs point to continued
growth in 2006, and our growth forecasts have
been revised up, as cyclical and structural factors
are becoming increasingly supportive. First,
exports are growing steadily, led by a strong
rebound to China, continued strength in the US
and the weaker yen. Second, private domestic
demand is strengthening, reflecting the end of
deflationary pressures arising from various post-
Bubble adjustments. The latter means that the
economy should be able to maintain reasonably
strong growth even if export growth were to slow.
China – balancing act
Chinese policymakers have recently stated that
rebalancing growth from investment towards
consumption will be a key objective in coming
years. Making stimulating consumption to
rebalance the growth being a top policy objective
implies that there will be no further tightening
measures in the near-term. In fact, growth in
money supplies has been picking up moderately
since July 2005. Combined with strong cash
inflows generated from a 30% surge in exports,
this has supported more than 27% growth in urban
fixed investment so far this year. Investment
growth will slow but not collapse, at least in the
near term. Growth momentum in consumer
spending is also strong. All this, plus our latest
upward revisions of 2006 GDP projections for
US, Japan and other Asian economies, leads us to
upgrade our GDP projection for 2006 from 8.3%
to 8.9%.


10
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


HSBC currency view
Through much of last year the dollar surprised
many in the market by its ongoing strength.
Helped by widening interest rate differentials and
the inflows into the dollar associated with the
American Jobs Creation Act (also known as the
Homeland Investment Act, or HIA), the funds
spent much of the year running with net long
dollar positions. This was in sharp contrast to the
late 2004 when comments from Fed Chairman
Greenspan led the funds to play the dollar from
the short side, pushing the currency aggressively
lower. With the funds long, the dollar surged
higher, irrespective of the underlying structural
issues that dominated market thinking the
previous year.
We expect this to change through 2006 and 2007,
with the dollar coming under renewed pressure.
Any further interest rate hikes by the Fed are
likely to be matched by interest rate rises
elsewhere, and the interest rate differential should
narrow. Already the funds have moved to hold net
short dollar positions. With the positive effect of
the HIA waning, the market will once again begin
to focus on structural imbalances. The dollar
could fall a long way. We continue to expect the
dollar to weaken, falling back towards the 1.35
level against the euro, while the yen is forecast to
appreciate to 110 against the greenback.
Yield differentials supported the dollar in 2005
-80
-40
0
40
80
120
Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06
1.14
1.19
1.24
1.29
1.34
basis points
dollar-euro (inverted)
dollar
yield differential
Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream
The outlook for interest rates
We expect the recent period of global monetary
tightening, that began when the Bank of England
started raising rates in March 2004, to come to an
end this year. Although the Fed is increasingly
data-dependent, we expect it to achieve the fabled
“neutral” level for US rates with a target rate of
4.75%. There is the possibility that if
unemployment continues to decline and capacity
utilisation rates increase, the peak may be higher,
at 5.25%, but at the moment we expect the peak to
come with another 25bp rise this quarter. In
Europe, the ECB has reacted to the acceleration in
growth and a modest uptick in headline inflation
by raising rates, although we do not expect this
tightening to extend beyond the second quarter. In
the UK, slowing economic growth points to lower
rates, sooner rather than later.
HSBC currency forecasts
Q1 05 Q2 05 Q3 05 Q4 05 Q1 06f Q2 06f Q3 06f Q4 06f
Europe EUR 1.30 1.21 1.21 1.18 1.23 1.27 1.30 1.35
UK GBP 1.89 1.79 1.77 1.72 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.78
Switzerland CHF 1.19 1.28 1.29 1.32 1.25 1.20 1.18 1.13
Japan JPY 107 111 113 118 115 112 110 108
China CNY 8.28 8.28 8.09 8.07 8.00 7.95 7.90 7.85
Canada CAD 1.21 1.22 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.13 1.13 1.13
Australia AUD 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.68
South Africa ZAR 6.22 6.67 6.36 6.34 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.25
Source: HSBC estimates


11
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


What about the yield curve?
One interesting feature of the fixed income
markets over recent months is that although the
Fed has been raising short rates, longer-dated
rates have been relatively stable. In turn, this has
led to a marked flattening of the yield curve. If the
Fed continues to raise rates, then the yield curve
will invert in the not-too-distant future,
historically a good lead indicator of recession and,
as the chart above shows, a good lead indicator of
a sharp fall in gold prices.
We remain unconvinced that this will be the case
this time. Historically, the yield curve inverts as a
result of both rising short and long rates, but short
rates rise faster than long rates, hence the yield
curve inversion. Frequently it is a rise in
inflationary expectations that pushes long rates
higher. At the same time, higher inflationary
expectations serves to trigger a monetary
tightening, a subsequent rise in short rates and
ultimately a yield curve inversion. This has not
been the case this time, as long rates have been
flat. As such, it is not necessarily the case that an
inverting yield curve is a harbinger of recession,
and, presumably the decline in inflationary
expectations that help cause gold prices to fall.
The outlook for inflation
In a world of increased economic linkages, we
continue to believe that there is little risk of a
sustained rise in inflationary pressures. Rather,
increased exports of cheap manufactured goods
from industrialising economies are exerting a
deflationary impact on global prices. This process
of globalisation is creating winners and losers;
workers in China and India gain at the expense of
Western labour, Western capital gains at the
expense of Western labour, and Western
consumers gain at the expense of Western labour.
In fact, Western labour does not do well in this
process at all. Globalisation is, however, not
without its problems, particularly if disadvantaged
Western labour attempts to protect its position
through protectionism. Critically, though, with
Western labour so weak, there is little evidence of
any second round effects of higher energy prices
emerging in the form of higher consumer price
inflation. We expect global CPI to slow from
+3.1% year-on-year in 2005, to +2.8% year-onyear
in 2006 and +2.4% year-on-year in 2007.
Global monetary tightening cycle coming to an end US yield curve and gold prices
0
2
4
6
8
Jan-96 Jan-98 Jan-00 Jan-02 Jan-04 Jan-06
Fed funds ECB repo BoE base rate
actual forecast
%
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Jan-83 Jan-87 Jan-91 Jan-95 Jan-99 Jan-03
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Gold US y ield curv e
%
USD/oz
Source: HSBC Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream


12
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


Macro influences on gold
Gold and inflation revisited
One of the reasons cited by the gold bulls for the
price rally in the second half of last year,
particularly in the immediate aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, was the “rise in inflationary
pressures caused by higher energy prices. Gold is
a traditional hedge and offers protection against
accelerating inflation….” In fact, as we noted
above, there is little evidence of a pick-up in
global inflationary pressures. True, there was a
temporary acceleration in headline inflation in the
third quarter of last year, but this was a purely
temporary move associated with the rise in energy
prices. Since then inflation has generally surprised
on the downside. Even if headline inflation does
edge higher, we doubt that this would justify
anywhere near the increase in gold prices over the
last six months.
Where’s the evidence?
There is, actually, very little statistical evidence to
support the thesis that there is any relationship
between gold and inflation. The following charts
show gold against the US CPI and, as can be seen,
there has been no meaningful relationship in the
last twenty five years. The second chart shows the
year-on-year change in gold prices against US
CPI. In fact, gold has enjoyed its fastest increases
when inflation has been low. When inflation is
rampant (+6-8% year-on-year), gold prices have
generally been falling. But what if gold is a
leading indicator of inflation? In this case it would
not be surprising that there is no correlation
between current prices and current inflation.
However, even by including different leads and
lags, we have been unable to find any evidence
that there has been any meaningful relationship
between gold and inflation in the last 25 years.
The halcyon days of the 1970s…
It may have been that there was a relationship
between gold and inflation in the 1970s, although
even here any relationship would be distorted by
the liberalisation of the gold market in the early
part of the decade. However, the 1970s was an
unusual period in economic and financial history,
and one that we do not see being repeated in the
near future. It was also a period where there were
few ways of protecting assets against the ravages
of inflation. Since then increased financial
sophistication – availability of inflation linked
bonds, for example – has made the use of gold to
hedge against inflation increasingly redundant.
Other markets appear unfazed by the
supposed inflation threat
Interestingly, a feature of most financial markets
has been – in contrast to the bullion market – how
relaxed they appear to be with regard to the
apparent increase in inflationary pressures. As our
asset allocation expert Richard Cookson noted in
his report A bug’s life, the truth is that investors in
Gold prices and inflation, where’s the link? Higher inflation = lower gold prices?
R2 = 0.0886
200
300
400
500
600
0 2 4 6 8 10
Gold price US$/oz
US headline CPI %yoy
current
R2 = 0.1203
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
0 2 4 6 8 10
%yoy change in gold price
US headline CPI %yoy
current
Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream


13
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


those securities that might be most affected by a
sharp pick-up in inflation – fixed-interest bonds –
have been remarkably unfazed. Since the autumn of
2002, for example, the US 10-year bond yield has
traded in a range of 3.9% to 4.9%, currently 4.4%.
The last time gold prices were at current levels, 10
year bond yields were more than double current
levels. No other financial market is exhibiting the
same concerns that there is a serious inflationary
threat that the gold bulls would have us believe is
evident in the gold market.
How does inflation justify the increase in local gold prices?
US US USD/oz UK UK GBP/oz Eurozone Eurozone EUR/oz
Headline CPI Core CPI Gold Headline CPI Core CPI Gold Headline CPI Core CPI Gold
Jan-04 2.1 1.2 417 1.8 1.7 234 1.4 1.0 331
Feb-04 1.8 1.3 398 1.5 1.8 219 1.3 0.9 320
Mar-04 1.9 1.6 400 1.5 1.8 214 1.1 0.8 321
Apr-04 2.3 1.7 426 1.8 1.9 230 1.2 1.0 345
May-04 3.0 1.7 388 2.3 1.9 219 1.6 1.0 324
Jun-04 3.1 1.8 395 2.2 1.9 215 1.6 1.2 323
Jul-04 3.0 1.8 396 2.1 1.8 218 1.4 1.0 326
Aug-04 2.6 1.7 392 2.1 2.0 215 1.3 0.9 326
Sep-04 2.4 2.0 408 1.9 1.8 228 1.1 0.8 335
Oct-04 3.1 2.0 417 2.1 1.9 232 1.2 0.8 337
Nov-04 3.5 2.2 428 2.0 1.8 233 1.5 0.9 336
Dec-04 3.4 2.3 453 2.2 1.9 234 1.6 1.3 340
Jan-05 2.9 2.2 438 1.8 1.6 230 1.6 1.2 325
Feb-05 3.0 2.3 420 2.0 1.4 223 1.6 1.1 323
Mar-05 3.1 2.4 432 2.0 1.6 225 1.9 1.2 328
Apr-05 3.5 2.2 426 2.0 1.3 226 1.9 1.3 328
May-05 2.8 2.2 436 1.9 1.6 230 1.9 1.4 340
Jun-05 2.5 2.1 416 2.0 1.5 230 2.0 1.4 339
Jul-05 3.1 2.1 428 2.2 1.3 242 2.3 1.7 358
Aug-05 3.6 2.2 431 2.3 1.3 244 2.4 1.7 353
Sep-05 4.7 2.0 440 2.3 1.4 240 2.6 1.4 353
Oct-05 4.3 2.0 466 2.3 1.6 266 2.5 1.5 391
Nov-05 3.5 2.1 460 2.1 1.5 260 2.3 1.6 383
Dec-05 3.4 2.2 502 2.0 1.3 290 2.2 1.5 428
Jan-06 513 298 434
Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream
Gold has surged higher, while fixed income markets remain becalmed
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
Jan-83 Jan-86 Jan-89 Jan-92 Jan-95 Jan-98 Jan-01 Jan-04
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
US 10 year bond Gold
USD/oz
%
Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream


14
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


On oil and gold
The buying of gold as an inflation hedge, because
of the fears over higher energy prices, is all the
more unjustifiable when the linkages between oil
and inflation, and oil and gold are considered in
more detail. Oil prices have surged higher in
recent years, of that there is no doubt, but to date
we have seen only a very limited inflation
response in only a limited number of countries.
More important, even in countries where inflation
has risen, the pick-up in inflation has been
considerably less than would have been expected
based on past relationships.
Higher oil prices do not mean higher inflation
The reality is that the impact of higher commodity
prices (including oil) on global inflationary trends
is not clear cut. As we argued earlier, Asia may be
pushing commodity prices higher, but at the same
time it is pushing wages lower. Two effects are
driving this process. First, Asian companies are
able to gain market share at the expense of their
western rivals by employing relatively cheap
labour and under cutting western-produced goods.
Second, western producers are able to use the
threat or reality of outsourcing to demand that
their workers accept lower wages.
Another way of putting this is that the price of
labour in relative terms is falling compared with
the price of commodities. More specifically, the
low price of labour is leading to declining
consumer goods prices which, in turn, lead to
higher demand for consumer goods and,
indirectly, higher demand and hence higher prices
for commodities. The inflation causality
associated with the 1970s and early 1980s is,
largely irrelevant in explaining recent events.
Higher oil prices do not mean higher gold
As such, it is hardly surprising that the statistical
evidence for any relationship between oil and gold
is much weaker than is widely believed. While
such relationships might have been strong in the
past, over recent years they have weakened
markedly. The correlation between oil and gold,
for example, over the last five years is a meagre
0.16. There have been periods when the markets
have moved in tandem, but this is the same for
any two series; there will almost certainly be
periods where there is an apparent correlation.
However, correlation does not imply causality.
Based on correlation, it would be better to trade
gold based on the tin price, rather than oil.
This should come as no great surprise, as the
economic justification for the relationship is tenuous
at best. In contrast to other commodity trades –
aluminium-copper and platinum-palladium for
example – where substitution is an obvious
transmission mechanism by which higher prices in
one commodity could affect another (albeit possibly
with long lags), this is not the case with oil-gold.
Oil prices and inflation Correlation of commodities vs gold
0
2
4
6
8
10
Jan-82 Jan-88 Jan-94 Jan-00 Jan-06
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
G7 CPI (LHS) Brent oil (RHS)
%yoy
US$/bl
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Oil
Nickel
Tin
Lead
Aluminium
Zinc
Palladium
Copper
Silv er
Platinum
Correlation coefficient
Source: HSBC, Thomson Financial Datastream Source: HSBC, WGC


15
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


Trends in supply and demand
Cause and effect in the gold market are frequently
interlinked and nowhere has this more obvious
than the interaction between prices and underlying
supply and demand. There is little doubt that the
strong fundamentals in the gold market in the first
half of the year helped trigger an improvement in
sentiment towards gold that helped drive prices
higher in the second half. Indeed, the publication
of the second-quarter supply/demand figures by
the World Gold Council and GFMS in early
September, which showed surging physical
demand and a market moving into deficit, helped
encourage the rebuilding of fund long positions
and a sharp move higher in the price.
Unfortunately, at least part of the apparent
strength in the market in the first half of the year
was a result of the prevailing low price. As the
market moved higher, so the fundamentals began
to deteriorate. Price-sensitive demand fell away,
while price sensitive supplies (particularly scrap)
surged higher. The effect was that the market
moved back into surplus in the third quarter, a
surplus we believe grew in the fourth quarter. Into
early 2006, we believe the market has remained in
surplus, although this excess has been reduced by
the increased interest in ETFs.
What’s in the balance?
At this point it is worth noting that there is an
ongoing debate as to what constitutes supply and
demand for gold. The chart and the table shown
below constitute what we believe to be the supply
and demand for physical gold. This includes all
flows of bullion through the market; on the supply
side, activities of producers (mine output and
hedging activities), central bank sales and scrap
and on the demand side, fabrication offtake and
physical investment (coins, bars and demand
through ETFs). The balance is added to, or drawn
from, industry stockpiles.
There are alternative presentations of supply and
demand. One beloved by the gold bulls is to show
the ongoing “gold gap”, that is, the supposed
structural deficit between flows of new gold. At
the very basic level this is the difference between
mine supplies and fabrication offtake. The
argument goes that on this measure the gold
market has been in structural deficit and needs
ongoing supplies from above-ground stocks
(scrap, central bank sales, producer hedging
and/or disinvestment) to accommodate the
shortfall. Any market reliant on a continued
drawdown of stocks must move higher, when
these inventories have been depleted, to bring
supply and demand back into balance.
Gold market balance and prices
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Q1 02 Q3 02 Q1 03 Q3 03 Q1 04 Q3 04 Q1 05 Q3 05 Q1 06f
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
Gold market balance (LHS) Gold price (RHS)
tonnes
USD/oz
Source: HSBC estimates, WGC, GFMS


16
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


Such a theory is nice in principle, and a similar
story has accounted for much of the speculative
interest in the silver market over the last decade (a
fundamental shortage can take an awfully long
time coming). However, while it is beyond doubt
that at the most basic level (fabrication offtake –
mine supplies) is in structural deficit, it can be
argued that scrap supplies should be included in
the calculation as they are immediately available
to the market. Once scrap is included, the “gold
gap” disappears. The amount of scrap returning to
the market is a lagged function of previous
consumption and should therefore be included. In
all of our other supply/demand balances for other
metals, we include scrap as a source of supply, not
a movement in inventory. The increase in gold
prices over the last four years has had a depressing
impact on demand while accelerating supplies,
effectively removing the supposed “gold gap”.
Supply/demand balance in gold (tonnes)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005f 2006f 2007f 2008f
Mine production 2591 2621 2589 2593 2463 2494 2550 2475 2450
Official sector net sales 479 527 545 617 474 663 450 450 400
Old gold scrap 610 708 835 939 829 840 800 825 850
Producer hedging -15 -151 -412 -279 -427 -195 -250 -200 -100
Total Supply 3665 3705 3557 3870 3339 3802 3550 3550 3600
Jewellery 3222 3016 2667 2481 2610 2741 2400 2650 2800
Electronics 282 200 207 235 261 265 268 270 273
Dentistry 69 68 69 67 68 70 65 65 65
Other industrial & decorative 99 97 82 80 83 83 83 83 83
Other Fabrication 450 365 358 382 412 418 416 418 576
Total Fabrication 3672 3381 3025 2863 3022 3159 2816 3068 3376
Bar hoarding 241 261 264 178 245 290 250 250 200
Official coins 77 82 96 105 114 120 120 120 120
Medals, imitation coins 29 29 26 27 29 40 35 35 35
Other retail -163 2 -26 15 -30 -50 -50 -50 -50
Exchange traded funds 0 0 3 32 119 202 300 200 200
Total identifiable investment 184 374 363 357 477 602 655 555 505
Total Demand 3856 3755 3388 3220 3499 3761 3471 3623 3881
Balance = Net Investment -191 -50 169 650 -160 42 79 -73 -281
Gold Price US$/oz 280 271 309 363 409 445 520 550 500
Source: HSBC estimates, WGC, GFMS
The gold market is in structural deficit... ... but not if you include scrap
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
tonnes
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
tonnes
Source: HSBC, WGC, GFMS Source: HSBC, WGC, GFMS


17
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


The outlook for gold supplies
Trends in gold mine output
Global gold mine production rose by a modest 31t
last year, recovering from 2004’s eight-year low.
The increase was partly as a result of a return to
normal operations at Freeport’s Grasberg mine,
following the pit wall collapse that depressed
output in 2004, and partly as a result of the
commissioning of new mines in Latin America.
This more than offset the continued decline in
South African production, and a fall in production
in Australia and Canada. Into 2006, mine
production is forecast to rise modestly, reflecting
higher capacity utilisation at new mines.
Out with the old, in with the new
Global gold mine production last year was 1t
higher than in 1997. Despite clarion calls from the
gold bulls that mine production was set to slump,
as yet there has been no significant change in
annual mine output. There has, however, been a
significant change in the location of gold mining
over recent years. In particular, production in the
old established producing countries of South
Africa, Australia, Canada and the US has been
declining. South African gold mine production,
for example, fell to just 342t last year, the lowest
level since 1934 and a far cry from the record
1,000t seen in 1970. Meanwhile, US production
has fallen by over 100t since 1997, while
Australian and Canadian output have fallen by 55t
and 43t, respectively, over the same period. By
contrast, recent years have seen a sharp increase
in production in Peru, China, Tanzania and
Russia, a trend we expect to continue.
Trends in mine costs
Until the third quarter of last year, less than half
of the increase in gold prices seen since early
2001 had fed through to higher returns to
shareholders. The balance was eaten up by
sharply higher production costs. From a low of
USD264/oz to the USD440/oz average in the third
quarter of last year, gold prices increased by
USD176/oz. However, average cash costs
increased by USD92/oz, leaving only USD84/oz
to feed through to increased producer margins.
There were significant variations by regions, most
notably the acute pressure on South African
producers caused by the ongoing strength of the
rand. South African margins increased by just
USD29/oz between Q1 2001 and Q3 2005, as
production costs rose by a whopping USD147/oz
due to rising domestic cost pressures – wage,
water, transport and raw materials, for example.
In contrast, Canadian cash costs increased by just
USD62/oz over the same period, allowing local
producers to enjoy a healthy USD114/oz increase
in margins.
Change in gold mine production 2004-05 Changes in gold mine production 1997-2005
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
tonnes
Mexico
Indonesia
South Africa
Australia
Canada
Uzbekistan
China
Mali
Brazil
Mal
i
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
tonnes
United S
tates
Australia
Argentina
Russia
Tanzania
South Africa
Canada
China
Mali
Brazil
Peru
Indonesia
Source: HSBC,GFMS Source: HSBC,GFMS


18
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


This changed in the fourth quarter of the year as
the rally in the gold price accelerated. With gold
prices in early 2006 over USD100/oz higher than
in the third quarter, the recent strength in gold has
clearly benefited shareholders rather than workers
(even allowing for some increase in costs over the
same period). We estimate current producer
margins have increased to over USD250/oz, a
level not seen at any point in the last fifteen years.
Unwinding of hedge positions slows
Although mine production has been relatively flat
over recent years, the actual impact of the
activities of the miners on the market has changed
enormously, principally as a result of the change
in attitude with respect to hedging. The supply of
gold from the miners is equal to mine output plus
any accelerated supplies through hedging. In the
late 1990s, for example, although mine output was
only around 2,500t, actual supplies of gold to the
market were around 3,000tpa, as around 500tpa of
future output was sold into the market as part of
hedging programmes.
This changed in 2001, as producers began to
deliver into existing hedge programmes, rather
than into the market. In 2004, net supplies to the
market fell to just 2,036t as over 400t of
outstanding hedge positions were closed out. With
mine supplies to the market over 1,000t below the
1999 peak, it is hardly surprising that sentiment
towards gold improved, with prices rallying likely
as a result.
Last year, net supplies to the market from miners
increased by 263t to 2,299t. This was principally
through a lower reduction in outstanding hedge
Gold prices and cash costs Margin over cash costs
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
Mar-92 Mar-95 Mar-98 Mar-01 Mar-04
Cash costs Gold price
US$/oz
50
100
150
200
250
300
Mar-91 Mar-94 Mar-97 Mar-00 Mar-03 Mar-06
US$/oz
Source: HSBC,GFMS Source: HSBC,GFMS
Producer supplies of gold to the market Outstanding hedge position at 1,600t at end
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
Mine production Hedging Net supplies
’tonnes
0
500
1000
1500
2000

2500
3000
3500
1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005f
tonnes
250
300
350
400
450
500
Outstanding hedge position Gold price
t $ /oz
USD/oz
Source: HSBC,GFMS Source: HSBC estimates,GFMS


19
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


positions, thereby increasing the amount sold into
the market. The lower level of “dehedging” was
partly as a result of the absence of any large oneoff
hedge book restructurings witnessed in 2004
(Sons of Gwalia, for example) and new hedge
positions taken out as part of project financing.
At the end of the fourth quarter, the outstanding
global hedge book amounted to just over 1,600t.
We expect a further reduction in the hedge book
this year, of around 250t, given the maturity
schedule and the delivery profile of existing hedge
positions. Corporate activity could lead to a more
aggressive reduction in the hedge position and, in
this respect, the recent Barrick Gold/Placer Dome
deal will be closely watched by the industry. As a
benchmark for the year as a whole, 250t seems a
reasonable starting point.
Central bank sales
Net central bank gold sales accelerated last year,
reaching a record 663t. In part, the increase was
due to a higher level of sales from European
central banks, and in part due to a sharp reduction
in purchases. With respect to sales, the revised
European central bank agreement signed in
September 2004 increased the annual sales limit
from 400tpa to 500tpa, with sales in calendar
2005 estimated to have been 500t. In addition,
there were significant sales from the Philippines
(59t) and the Bank for International Settlements.
With respect to purchases, gross purchases
totalled just 14t last year (Mongolia, Kazakhstan
and Belarus) a far cry from the levels seen in 2004
when demand was boosted by the 55t purchased
by the central bank of Argentina.
European Central Bank Gold Agreement
September 2004 saw the renewal of the Central
Bank Gold Agreement, the accord between
European central banks to formalise sales of
bullion into the market. The annual (September 27
to September 26) quota for sales was increased
under the agreement to 500tpa, with a cumulative
maximum for the five-year total of 2,500t.
However, we continue to find it difficult to
identify how the European central banks will
come anywhere near the five-year limit.
Identifiable sales total just 1,267t
Total confirmed and probable sales under the
renewed agreement currently stand at 1,441t, of
which 599t has already taken place and a further
842t are expected to take place over the balance of
the agreement. Within this category we have
included the 130t of Swiss sales, which completes
the longstanding disposal programme, the 600t of
likely French sales (151t already completed) and
the Dutch sale of 165t (75t already). In addition,
we have included likely Portuguese sales of 160t
(of which 65t has been completed), Austrian sales
of 90t (of which 15t done already) and probable
Swedish sales of 60t (17t done). We have also
included the ECB sales of 47t it has undertaken so
far and the 6t of gold sold by Bundesbank for coin
minting. These sales total 1,441, or just over half
of the potential sales under the agreement.
Potential sales of a further 876t
In addition to these sales, there is a potential 876t
of central bank disposals that can be identified.
Within this we would include a further 594t of
German sales if the Bundesbank were to take up
its full 600t allocation (although it passed on the
possibility of sales in the first year of the revised
agreement and has not yet stated its intentions). In
addition, we have included a further 220t of
possible ECB sales, which is approximately what
would need to be sold to reduce its holdings to
15% of total reserves, and a possible 62t of
Belgian sales.
Leaves the Agreement almost 200t short
Even in the unlikely event that all of these sales
materialise, this would still take total sales under
the renewed Central Bank Gold Agreement at just
over 2,300t, still almost 200t short of the
maximum permissible. Unless another central


20
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


bank emerges as a seller, we remain of the view
that the full 2,500t quota will not be filled. Indeed,
in the event that either the Bundesbank and/or the
ECB decide not to undertake any further sales,
aggregate sales will fall short of the 2,500t
maximum.
Will Asian central banks buy gold?
The market’s perception towards the issue of
central bank sales over recent months has been
very much that the planned European sales are
well documented and, as such, are ‘already in the
price’ and, that if there are to be any shocks, then
it is more likely to come as a result of new central
bank buying rather than selling. In particular, the
market has seized upon comments by the central
banks of Russia and South Africa (both of which
have expressed a desire to increase their gold
holdings) as a reason to be bullish. In addition,
market speculation has focused on Asian central
banks, particularly China and Japan, where gold
holdings remain very low. Given the size of the
burgeoning currency reserves in China and Japan,
any diversification could be potentially very
bullish for gold indeed.
With respect to China, forex reserves at the end of
2005 had increased to a whopping USD809bn, up
USD209bn during the course of the year. Gold
reserves in China have been publicly put at 600t,
which at USD550/oz would be valued at just
under USD11bn, or just 1.4% of total reserves.
With respect to Japan, total reserves totalled
USD847bn at the end of last year, of which gold
holdings of 765t accounted for just 1.6%.
The problems with diversification
There would be a number of problems with regard
to any policy of diversification out of dollars and
into other assets (other currencies and/or
commodities), not least the fact that any
meaningful sale of dollars would almost certainly
trigger a sharp move lower in the US currency,
thereby devaluing any remaining dollar holdings.
This was a point voiced by US Treasury Secretary
Snow, who noted that “…people who own US
assets have an interest in seeing that paper
sustain its value. China is a large holder… If the
value of our paper were to fall, they would find
they had a large loss of net wealth. It’s not in
their interests.”
Gold sales under CBGA II
Gold Gold Sold Will Could Total
tonnes% reserves sell sell sales Comments
Germany 3428 67.5 6 0 594 600 Sold 6t, undecided on whether to sell up to 600t
France 2856 59.3 151 449 0 600 Intends to sell 500-600t
Italy 2452 59.4 0 0 0 0 No plans to sell
Switzerland 1290 35.2 130 0 0 130 Has completed 1,300t sales programme
Netherlands 717 52.4 75 90 0 165 Will sell 165t under CBGA II
Spain 473 42.8 63 0 62 125 Has sold, but no stated policy
Portugal 408 58.2 65 95 0 160 Has sold, but no stated policy
Austria 303 36.7 15 75 0 90 Will sell up to 90t
Belgium 228 27.1 30 90 0 120 Has sold, but no stated policy
Sweden 155 9.9 17 43 0 60 Has sold, but no stated policy
Greece 108 66.7 0 0 0 0 No stated policy and has not sold
Finland 49 6.9 0 0 0 0 No stated policy and has not sold
Ireland 6 3.2 0 0 0 0 No stated policy and has not sold
Luxembourg 2 11.1 0 0 0 0 No stated policy and has not sold
ECB 720 22.2 47 0 220 267
Total above 13195 599 842 876 2317
Source: HSBC, WGC, IFS


21
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


Another problem for both China and, particularly,
Japan, would be that a lurch lower in the dollar, if
triggered by any moves to diversify reserves,
would, by definition, have to come against other
currencies, which would presumably include the
yen and the renminbi. However, both China and
Japan have been keen to ensure that their
currencies do not appreciate too sharply against
the dollar, to prevent any threat to their critical
export sectors. The renminbi remains a managed
currency while the Japanese have intervened in
the past to cap the yen’s rise. Against this
background any aggressive move that would
threaten to push the dollar sharply lower looks
unlikely.
It could well be that, rather than diversify the
country’s mix of currency exposure, the Chinese
authorities are looking at utilising the reserves in a
more proactive manner. Rather than accumulating
US treasuries, for example, the Chinese
government could use the reserves to secure
energy and other commodity resources overseas.
However, such a strategy is not without its
problems, as last year’s attempted purchase of US
independent oil producer Unocal by Chinese oil
company CNOOC proved. The USD18bn deal ran
into significant political pressure in the US, and
was abandoned last August. Unocal was
subsequently purchased by Chevron in November.
A final problem is the size of the gold market
relative to the currency markets. Put simply, the
gold market is too small for the Chinese and
Japanese governments to achieve any meaningful
diversification into gold. Consider the following
statistics (all based on spot price of USD560/oz):
 For China to raise its gold in reserves to the
international average of 8.9% would require
the purchase of an additional 3,613t.
 For China to raise its gold in reserves to the
ECB benchmark of 15.0% would require the
purchase of an additional 6,501t.
 For Japan to raise its gold in reserves to the
international average of 8.9% would require
the purchase of an additional 3,666t.
 For Japan to raise its gold in reserves to the
ECB benchmark of 15.0% would require the
purchase of an additional 6,701t.
 For both China and Japan to raise their gold
in reserves to the international average of
8.9% would require the combined purchase of
an additional 7,279t.
 For both China and Japan to raise its gold in
reserves to the ECB benchmark of 15.0%
would require the purchase of an additional
13,202t.
Chinese gold and total reserves Russian gold and total reserves
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
0
20
40
60
80
Gold Forex Gold % total (RHS)
%
USD

Gold % total
0
50
100
150
200
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Value of gold in reserves Total reserves
USD Bn
Source: HSBC, IFS Source: HSBC, IFS


22
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


A moving target
Moreover, with Chinese and Japanese reserves
continuing to rise, the Bank of China and the
Bank of Japan would be required to make
continued purchases in the bullion market. Taking
2005 as a benchmark, Chinese reserves rose by
USD209bn. Just maintaining gold’s share of total
reserves constant at 1.4% would require an annual
purchase of 165t. If China ever achieved the 15%
ECB benchmark, holding this constant with
reserves rising at the current rate would require
the purchase of 1,773tpa.
Ditto Russia
Russia has also faced a similar problem as strong
commodity prices – particularly energy – have led
to ongoing current account surpluses and a sharp
rise in official reserves. Total reserves at the end
of 2005 stood at USD182bn, up USD57bn at the
end of 2004. Russian gold reserves over recent
years have generally been between 300-500t, with
a value of USD3-5bn at market prices. In the late
1990s, this meant that gold accounted for 25-40%
of reserves, a proportion which has declined to
under 5% today.
In recent years, the Russian authorities have noted
that they would like to increase the proportion of
gold in reserves to around 10%, but found the
high gold price to be prohibitive and, as such,
have not added to gold reserves in a significant
way. However, it is clear that the Russian
authorities are taking the issue of the weakness in
the dollar seriously and in late 2003 moved to
increase the share of euros in reserves at the
expense of dollars. At the time they noted that
Europe was by far the largest trading bloc for the
Russian Federation.
Is there another buyer?
Over recent weeks gold prices have surged higher,
despite a relatively flat CFTC Commitments of
Traders report. Interest in ETFs has clearly
increased over the period, but this on its own is
unlikely to have justified a USD100/oz rise in the
gold price. In turn, this has led to speculation that
there has been another buyer in the market,
possibly a central bank. Given the increased
tension in the Middle East, particularly with
respect to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, this is a
possibility, although as yet there is no evidence to
support such a thesis.
Outlook for gold demand
We noted above that there is no clear consensus
on how best to present the supply/demand
statistics for gold. While some elements of supply
and demand are easily identifiable – mine
production and the use of gold in jewellery
fabrication, for example – it is less clear how
other facets, most notably investment demand for
gold, should be accounted for.
This is particularly the case with respect to
investment demand from ETFs, such as Gold

Bullion Securities. A case can easily be made for
the exclusion of such demand from a
supply/demand table as it simply reflects a
transfer of above-ground stocks from one holder
to another. A sale of aluminium inventory from
one trader to another, for example, would be
excluded from our aluminium supply/demand
table. However, gold is different from other
metals in that we do include sales from above
ground stocks – most notably, central bank sales –
as a source of supply and as such a case can be
made for including demand from ETFs. This is
particularly so given that gold purchased for the
ETFs is held in ‘allocated’ accounts and, as such,
is not available to be lent to the market.
H1 2005 demand up 20.2%
There is little doubt that part of the improved
sentiment towards the gold market in the second
half of last year was a result of the publication of
the Q2 2005 supply/demand numbers by GFMS
and the World Gold Council, which showed a


23
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


sharp rise in physical demand. In the first half of
2005, demand for gold for jewellery fabrication
increased by 17% year-on-year, to 1,486t. There
was little change in ‘other fabrication’ demand,
while offtake of physical gold for investment
purposes (coins, bars and holdings in ETFs) was
unspectacular. Demand in the first quarter
increased, reflecting the US listing of the
streetTRACKS® and iShares ETFs in late 2004,
but weakened markedly in the second quarter. The
net effect was that total demand in the first half of
last year increased by 20.2% to 2,008t.
Second-half demand down 4.2%
However, as prices rose in the second half of the
year, offtake weakened, particularly in the
jewellery market. Demand for gold for jewellery
fabrication fell by 6.6% year-on-year in the
second half of the year, to 1,255t. There was little
change in other fabrication demand, but a surge in
investment demand for gold helped reduce the fall
in physical offtake to 4.2%. Offtake of gold for
investment purposes rose to 291t. On a year-onyear
comparative basis, this is a modest increase
of just 2.5%, although this is distorted by the fact
that the ETF listings in the US saw huge inflows
in Q4 2004. We believe that the acceleration in
gold holdings at the ETFs helped trigger a marked
improvement in market sentiment, particularly in
the final quarter.
As ever, identifying cause and effect in the gold
market is notoriously difficult – was the gold price
rising because of inflows into ETFs, or were the
inflows into ETFs triggered by the rising gold price?
Demand from the jewellery sector
Spending on gold jewellery up 50% since 2001
Having fallen from a recent peak of 3,222t in
2000, to a 12-year low of 2,481t in 2003, gold
demand from the jewellery sector increased to
2,610t in 2004. Demand remained strong in the
first half of 2005, and although consumption
weakened in the second half, the year as a whole
still registered an increase in offtake to 2,740t.
The rise in demand was all the more impressive
given that it came against a background of a rising
gold price. As a result, the total expenditure on
gold from the jewellery sector increased from a
low of just USD26.3bn in 2001 to an estimated
USD39.2bn last year, an increase of almost 50%.
There are a number of reasons why the spending
on gold jewellery has increased so markedly in
recent years. In the first place, consumers have
become adjusted to the concept of a high and
rising gold price, and are much more willing to
buy jewellery pieces where the underlying metal
Physical gold demand
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
Q1 03 Q2 03 Q3 03 Q4 03 Q1 04 Q2 04 Q3 04 Q4 04 Q1 05 Q2 05 Q3 05 Q4 05f Q1 06f
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
Jew ellery Other fabrication Phy sical inv estment Gold price (RHS)
tonnes
USD/oz
Source: HSBC estimates, WGC


24
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


value is expected to rise, rather than fall. This is
not to say that there is no price sensitivity to
demand, as the weakness in the second half of last
year showed. Merely the interaction between
demand and prices is far more complicated than
many in the market believe.
The market has also benefited from more astute
marketing campaigns than in the past, particularly

with the more recent speak gold campaign.
Following extensive market research, the gold
industry noted that while spending on luxury
goods had risen, gold had lost market share to
other competing products – overseas holidays,
consumer electronics, etc. This resulted in the
recent speak gold campaign launched by the
World Gold Council, which aims to promote the
usage of gold against a much wider range of
luxury goods than had previously been the case.
We expect the sharp rise in prices in the first half
of this year to have a depressing impact on
offtake, a conclusion that is supported by
anecdotal evidence from the market. However, we
would expect a recovery in demand at a much
higher price level. Dips down towards USD500/oz
and certainly below that, are likely to encourage
substantial buying interest.
Investment demand rising
Total identifiable investment demand for physical
gold rose sharply last year, to 602t, the highest
level since 1989. In addition, unidentified/implied
net disinvestment was a further 42t. Although
largely a residual item after all of the other
supply/demand items have been taken into
consideration, it is clear that there must have been
some unidentified investor buying – either
voluntary or involuntary – to bring the market
ultimately to balance.
All eyes on the ETFs
Much attention over the past 12 months has been
focused on the World Gold Council’s attempts to
stimulate investment demand for bullion through its
range of ETFs. Currently there are five ETFs listed,
four under the Gold Bullion stable with the fifth
being the Barclays’ iShares Comex gold trust.
The funds work by effectively securitising gold.
With the Gold Bullion ETFs, for example, for
every 10 shares issued, 1oz of gold will be taken
from the market and held in a trust account, with
the bullion stored in the vaults of HSBC. The
hope of the World Gold Council is that this will
allow institutional investors prohibited from
holding commodities, and/or seeking the benefits
of portfolio diversification offered by gold, access
to the bullion market. Similarly, retail investors,
deterred by the high investment costs, should be
able to gain exposure to gold at close to the
prevailing spot price.
Volume of precious metals used in jewellery manufacturing Value of precious metals used in jewellery manufacturing
0
100
200
300
400
1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Gold Silv er Platinum Palladium
Moz
0
10
20
30
40
50
1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006f
Gold Silv er Platinum Palladium
USDBn
Source: HSBC estimates, WGC, GFMS Source: HSBC estimates, WGC, GFMS


25
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


The early market perception of the products was
that although there was some initial success, this
was largely a one-off portfolio adjustment and
that the products had failed to attract an ongoing
inflow of funds. However, perception began to
change in the second half of last year as the trickle
of new inflows accelerated. Total holdings of gold
in trust increased by 115t in the second half of last
year, with 77t added in the fourth quarter alone.
Nor does the higher price appear to have
depressed demand, with the increase in gold
holdings of 44t in December and 42t in the first
three weeks in January.
Perception has it that the inflows reflect long-term
investment, and are unlikely to be reversed in a
period of weaker prices, a contention with which it
is difficult to disagree, but which remains untested
in a declining price environment. At the most
recent pace of inflows, increased demand from
ETFs will entirely offset the planned sales by the
European central banks. Indeed, at current
holdings, the ETFs would rank 14th among the
world’s central banks, between Russia (387t) and
Portugal (408t). Should the inflows continue at the
recent pace, our forecast for ETF demand for the
year as a whole of 300t would need to be revised.
Demand for gold from commodity indices
One key development over the course of the past
two years that has further boosted commodity
prices is the increased investment in the sector by
pension funds and other long-term investors buying
exposure through commodity index products.
There is little hard information available
regarding such flows, but consensus has it that
total commodity investments in index and
structured products at the end of last year totalled
around USD75bn, up from USD45-50bn at the
end of 2004. Most of this is believed to be
invested in the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index
(GSCI), with the balance in other indices (the
Dow Jones-AIG and Reuters/Jefferies CRB
indices, for example). Further inflows of USD25-
30bn are expected this year.
The increased investment in commodity indices
has not affected all metals equally, given the
different weightings that individual metals have in
the indices. As a guide, a USD25bn investment in
commodities (say USD17bn into the GSCI and
USD4bn each into the DJ-AIG and Reuters
Jefferies CRB) this year would purchase the
metals shown in the following table.
Total gold holdings at the ETFs
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Mar-03 Jul-03 Nov-03 Mar-04 Jul-04 Nov-04 Mar-05 Jul-05 Nov-05
GBS Australia GBS London NewGold streetTRACKS iShares
tonnes
Source: HSBC, GBS, Barclays


26
Macro
Commodities
27 January 2006


What USD25bn in commodity funds would buy
Aluminium 422,000t Gold 1.33moz
Copper 185,000t Silver 16.7moz
Lead 42,000t Platinum -
Nickel 18,000t Palladium -
Tin -
Zinc 100,000t
Note: Assumes USD17Bn in GSCI and USD4Bn each in Reuters-Jefferies and DJ-AIG
Source: HSBC
Based on the gold weightings in the various
indices (gold had a 1.6% weighting in the GSCI
last year and a 5.4% weighting in the DJ-AIG),
this would equate to an investment in gold of
around USD1.9bn at the end of 2005. During the
course of the year, this would equate to additional
investment in gold of around USD0.9bn. Using
the current spot price of USD560/oz, this would
equate additional gold buying of around 1.3moz
(61t) of gold.
We readily admit that given the uncertainties in
estimating the inflows into commodity indices,
these estimates should be greeted with a great deal
of caution. Nevertheless, as an indicator of order
of magnitude, it seems clear that the “wall of
money” flowing into commodity indices and other
structured products has been much less important
in driving the gold price higher than short-term
speculative flows in and out of the Comex futures
contract, flows in and out of Tocom, and also the
ongoing steady inflow into the gold exchange
traded funds that the market enjoyed through the
second half of last year.


27
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28
Macro
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29
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30
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Alan Williamson
Analyst, Head of Commodities Research
+44 20 7991 5954 alan.williamson@hsbcib.com
Specialist Sales
Andrew Wallis
+44 20 7991 5079 andrew.wallis@hsbcib.com
Paul Durham
+1 212 525 0221 paul.durham@us.hsbc.com
Global Commodities Research Team